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JAMES MARTINEAU
AND HIS
GREATEST BOOK

J. T. AND E. R. SUNDERLAND

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
“High hearts are never long without hearing some new call, some distant clarion of God, even in their dreams; and soon they are observed to break up the camp of ease and start on some fresh march of faithful service. And, looking higher still, we find those who never wait till their moral work accumulates, and who reward resolution with no rest; who do the good only to see the better and see the better only to achieve it; who are too meek for transport, too faithful for remorse, too earnest for repose; whose worship is action, and whose action ceaseless aspiration.”—Martineau’s “Endeavours.”

Compliments of

J. T. SUNDERLAND

JAMES MARTINEAU:

**A BRIEF SKETCH
OF HIS LIFE AND WORK.**



**BY
JABEZ T. SUNDERLAND, M.A.**

“That God is a Spirit, has not hindered him from shaping the vault of night, and hanging it with stars; or from tinting the tender blue of day; or from spreading the sheet of sea, and streaking it with green and gold; or from poisoning the summer clouds, to fling the chase of purple shadows on the hills; or from shining through the cool lights of the spring woods; or from dwelling in our humanity, to touch it with many a grace and repeat in it the image of his piety and his truth; or from resting with the Man of Sorrows as the symbol of his piety and holy love. These are the works of his Creativeness,—the appeal of his Beauty to our hearts,—the mighty Poem he improvises through all the rhythm of the Universe.”—Martineau’s “Hours of Thought.”



James Martineau

HIS LIFE AND WORK.

James Martineau was born April 21, 1805, in Norwich, England, and died January 11, 1900, in London, at the age of almost ninety-five years,—his life's long day having reached its natural evening; his life's full year having rounded to its late autumn, with extraordinarily rich harvests reaped and garnered.

GREAT MEN.

God's most precious gifts to the world are great men. But the value of great men varies according to the quality of their greatness. Mere intellectual greatness, unaccompanied with moral, is of comparatively low value. Indeed, a man of intellectual brilliancy may even be a curse to the world, if he uses his intellectual powers for evil ends. But great men who are not only great in intellect, but great also in moral character—who possess not only brilliant mental powers, but the will to use them for highest purposes—such men are blessings to the world whose value cannot be overestimated.

We speak of "Alexander the Great." Such greatness as the famous Greek conqueror represents, stands for mingled good and evil. In like manner, the greatness of a Cæsar or a Napoleon, or even of a Wellington and a Grant, represent some influences that conserve and benefit, and some that hurt and destroy. But there is a class of great men whom we may look upon as representing good, and only good, to the race. In this class we find such historic names as Socrates, Plato, Isaiah, Paul, Luther, Milton, Wesley, Channing, and, above all, Jesus. In this company Martineau belongs, because in him, as in them, splendid intellectual gifts were allied with moral endowments equally splendid, and his brilliant powers were employed, not for destructive or selfish ends, but to advance truth, righteousness, peace, love, and whatsoever makes for the permanent betterment of the world.

MARTINEAU'S ENDOWMENTS.

Martineau was a member of the famous London Metaphysical Society, which contained many of the most eminent thinkers, literary men, scientists, and public leaders of England, such as Gladstone, Ruskin, Huxley, Tyndall, Tennyson, the Archbishop of York, Professors Sidgwick and Mivart, Dr. W. B. Carpenter, Mr.

R. H. Hutton, Lord Selborne, and Archbishop Manning. Tennyson has left it on record that he regarded Martineau as the master mind of all that remarkable company; and Gladstone said to Frances Power Cobbe, "Martineau is beyond question the greatest of living thinkers." This was high praise. But best of all, Martineau was as great morally as he was intellectually. He always used his splendid powers for worthiest ends—to discover and give to the world the highest kind of truth—moral truth, spiritual truth, religious truth, such truth as would feed the best that was in men, and therefore most benefit mankind.

Dr. Martineau's endowments were both many and rich. His was a subtle, keen, and penetrating intellect. He was a trained logician. He was a profound philosophic thinker. He was a spiritual seer. He had a vivid and powerful imagination, which was forever at play, and which cast the fascinating lights and shadows of poetry and symbol upon all he said and wrote. He was gifted with a rich and stately eloquence. As Dr. Forsyth says: 'His style alone would have given him influence,—so lucid, jewelled, over-polished at times, perhaps, but never metallic; full of fancy—sometimes too full—and of imagery now scientific, now poetic; full

of delicacy, lithe as steel, with a careful felicity 'saying the unsayable.' Newman alone ranked with him in this regard." He was a most devout worshipper. He had a striking and powerful personality. One of his well-known contemporaries declares that his personality was the most impressive and commanding he ever met, not excepting Gladstone's.

Martineau's life was not only unusually long, but it was filled throughout with strenuous work. It is hardly too much to speak of it as three lives in one.

THE PREACHER.

First, we have Martineau the Preacher. Add together his four years as minister in Dublin, his twenty-five years in Liverpool, and his fourteen at Little Portland street, London, and we have more than forty years of steady pulpit work. And it was pulpit work into which he never failed to put his best of mind and heart. How high was its quality may be learned from the strong testimony of those who listened with absorbed attention to his intense and eloquent discourses, and may be seen also by turning to his volumes of printed sermons, which have carried his fame as a preacher into every civilized land. Such a ministry alone, with no other labours added, would seem to be enough for one man.

THE TEACHER.

Second, we have Martineau the Teacher. Here again we meet with what would seem to be nearly or quite a full life-work. He taught a year with Dr. Carpenter, in Bristol, in very early manhood, before entering upon his career as a preacher. Then, after he had been preaching in Liverpool six years or so, at the age of thirty-five, he was appointed to the chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Political Economy in Manchester College. Here his real career as a teacher began. And it continued, with the interruption, I believe, of only a single year—when he was absent for study in Germany—through forty-five years.

During all that long time, either as Professor in the College, or as its Principal, he held a shaping hand on the education of a large proportion of the young men trained for the Unitarian and Liberal Christian ministry in Great Britain, and of not a few from other lands. The influence of this work as an educator cannot be told. It was an influence not only to clarify the thinking, and guide the research, and widen the knowledge, but to ennoble the moral ideals, to quicken the enthusiasm, and to deepen the spiritual life, of these young men, and through them the churches which they

would be called to serve. His aim was to give his students not only trained minds, but disciplined wills, and purified affections. It was to send them into the work of the ministry to propagate a religion at once free, enlightened, and devout; to proclaim a Gospel in harmony with all truth, all beauty, all goodness, and rich in the deepest pieties of the heart; to plant in men a faith which no advance of knowledge, and no revolution of human thought, can disturb, because grounded in the living revelation of God in the human soul. These were the ends for which he strove. How well he succeeded, let the work done by the ministers of the Liberal Churches of Great Britain and Ireland, and beyond, for more than fifty years, bear witness.

THE WRITER.

The third Martineau was the persuasive, the powerful, the brilliant, the indefatigable Writer, who, from early manhood to the extreme age of ninety, was constantly giving forth to the world pamphlets, printed sermons, printed lectures, articles in daily and weekly papers, elaborate articles in magazines and reviews, and, most important of all, books which never failed to attract attention, to awaken thought, and to compel assent or dissent. What made it pos-

sible for him to produce so many papers and articles of thought and learning, and so many books, was the fact that there was a unity in all he did, so that he was able to pour into his printed pages the wealth of both his pulpit and his teacher's chair. His sermons were of so high an order that they stood the test of type. His college lectures furnished material for some of his greatest published works. Thus the streams of both his preaching and his teaching were indispensable tributaries to the stream of his authorship.

PRINCIPAL WORKS.

Dr. Martineau's most important books are the following:

"Endeavours After the Christian Life." Sermons, 2 volumes; published 1843 and 1847.

"Hours of Thought on Sacred Things." Sermons, 2 volumes; 1876 and 1879.

These sermons deal with themes of the universal religious life and have found admiring readers in every religious communion. Many persons agree with Mr. R. H. Hutton when he says: "In these wonderful sermons the real Martineau, the spiritual teacher who will endure, has accomplished his greatest and finest work. * * * Spirit speaks with spirit in these pages, which are worthy of the finest mys-

ticism of the Catholic Church at its best, while at the same time they are manly, healthy, in harmony with human reason, and couched in a singularly noble and remarkable prose style."

"Types of Ethical Theory," 2 volumes, 1885.

In this work Dr. Martineau makes a critical examination of the principal theories of ethics, ancient and modern, with a view to finding a satisfactory explanation of conscience, and a trustworthy thought-basis for man's moral life. Probably in no other single treatise have we at once so lucid a compendium and so penetrating and exhaustive a critique of all the more important schools of ethical philosophy (except the Hegelian, which, rather singularly, Dr. Martineau does not take up) as in this masterly work.

"A Study of Religion: Its Sources and Its Contents." 2 volumes, 1888.

This work is a treatise, rich in spiritual insight as well as profound in thought, upon the great themes which are fundamental in any true philosophy of religion, namely, Knowledge, Cause, the Intellectual and Moral Aspects of the Universe, Theism, Personality, Pantheism, Freedom, Immortality. When the book appeared it was at once welcomed by the leaders of nearly every school of religious thought. Dr.

Martineau's fame as a religious philosopher was already very high; perhaps this work carried it to its zenith. Probably I should be safe in saying that it is generally regarded as his *magnum opus*.

"The Seat of Authority in Religion." 1890.

This is a profound and luminous study of Nature, Humanity, History, Revelation, the Christian Church, the Bible and Jesus, with a view to finding out with what degree of authority each speaks to men; or, in what way and with what emphasis the Divine Voice speaks through each. In his Sermons, Types of Ethical Theory and Study of Religion, Dr. Martineau for the most part keeps common ground with thinkers of all Christian denominations, but in this work he shows himself the independent, progressive, radical thinker, who accepts cordially the conclusions of science, comparative religion, and the higher criticism of the Bible, and who does not hesitate to enunciate views distinctly at variance with the orthodoxy of his time. This is the work in which we have Martineau the *liberal* thinker and writer at his clearest, completest and best.

"Essays, Reviews and Addresses."

Volume I.—Personal and Political, 1890.

Volume II.—Ecclesiastical and Historical, 1890.

Volume III.—Theological and Philosophical, 1891.

Volume IV.—Academical and Religious, 1891.

In these four volumes Dr. Martineau, near the close of his life, gathered together in revised form such as he desired permanently to preserve of those striking miscellaneous writings which had appeared in reviews, magazines and pamphlets during more than fifty years; and which, attracting attention in the world of thought at the times of their appearance, had gradually won for him a place among the first philosophical and religious thinkers of his age. These Essays, Reviews and Addresses are second in philosophic importance to the three extended philosophic works named above; possibly they may not keep their place in public attention so long as the sermons, which are unique, both in spiritual quality and in literary style; but they are masterly discussions of subjects most of which are of lasting interest, and they give us sides of Martineau's thinking which we find nowhere else brought out so clearly.

"*A Study of Spinoza*," 1882.

This is a work of considerable philosophical value, though hardly to be classed among the

author's most important productions, especially as its treatment of Pantheism (the central theme dealt with) is to some extent duplicated in Book III. of his *Study of Religion*.

During his life Dr. Martineau compiled three hymn books—the first called “*Hymns of Christian Worship*,” in the year 1831, while he was in Dublin; the second, “*Hymns for Christian Church and Home*,” in Liverpool, 1840; and the last, “*Hymns of Praise and Prayer*,” after he had retired from the pulpit, but while he was carrying on his work of teaching in London, 1873. Deep as was always his interest in the thought-side of religion, his interest was deeper still in the worship-side. He said of himself: “Both conviction and feeling keep me close to the poetry and the piety of Christendom. They are my native air.” His objects in making his hymn collections were three: “The gradual enrichment of our religious literature by new hymns”; the dropping out of hymns containing “objective and mythological elements,” which the intelligence of our time have outgrown and ought to leave behind; and the introduction (in the place of those discarded) of hymns expressive of the “simple and natural piety” of the heart, and of that deep spiritual devotion which he felt to be the essence of the religion of Christ.

Dr. Martineau was also deeply interested in providing for the liberal churches of England an improved liturgy; and to this end he prepared two "*Services for Public Worship*" which have long been in wide use.

The last book given by Dr. Martineau to the world was a small volume entitled "*Home Prayers*," at the end of the year 1891. Dr. Drummond, his biographer, truly says: "Here, even more than in his sermons, we hear the 'tender voice' of his spirit; and these humble outpourings of his heart's devotion fitly close the long and splendid series of his publications."

HONOURS.

Few men have received so many academic and other honours as Dr. Martineau. But his honours were somewhat late in coming. It is interesting to notice that America, rather than England, was earliest in appreciating and giving recognition to his greatness, as was also true in the case of Carlyle. In 1872 Harvard University conferred upon Martineau the degree of LL.D. He was then sixty-seven years of age. Leyden followed, in 1875, with its S.T.D.; Edinburgh, in 1884, with its D.D.; and Oxford, in 1888, when he had reached the age of eighty-three, with its D.C.L. Four years later still,

in 1892, Dublin added its LL.D. to that of Harvard. Quite as notable were the honours that came to him in other forms. Nearly all his later birthdays were marked by tributes from distinguished men. Perhaps the most memorable of these was the address presented to him on his eighty-third birthday, written by Dr. Jowett, of Oxford, recognizing in the warmest terms the great service which he had rendered philosophical and religious thought, and signed by more than six hundred of the most eminent writers, philosophical thinkers, artists, scientists, educators, religious leaders, and public men of Great Britain, America, and the Continent of Europe, the names of Tennyson, Browning, Edwin Arnold, Max Müller, Dean Bradley, Jowett himself, and James Russell Lowell heading the list.

LIMITATIONS.

I have spoken of Dr. Martineau's many and rare gifts. But it needs to be added that only to a limited extent were they popular gifts. They seemed, in a way, to lift him above, and to separate him from, the great mass of his fellows. As Wordsworth sang of Milton:—

“His soul was like a star, and dwelt apart.”

He was a great preacher; but it was a preacher for the few rather than the many. He

was a great teacher; but it was a teacher for thoughtful and mature minds. He was in his right place as a teacher of young men preparing for the Christian ministry. In such a place all his genius for imparting, and his still greater genius for quickening and inspiring, had full play.

He was a great writer; but it was a writer for the cultured—for men with trained intelligence, for thinkers. He could not easily reach common minds. This he realized, and sometimes it sorely troubled him. He spoke of it as a limitation, which he had tried to shake off, but found himself unable. Once, soon after the appearance of his great work on Theism, he wrote to me saying that it was one of the regrets of his life that he was not able to write more simply, confessing that he often felt the need of an interpreter or a translator to bring his books within reach of minds that he wanted to reach, and asking me if we had not on our side of the water somebody who could translate or interpret him to the public at large.

But if his writings appealed directly to only a comparatively few minds, they were the ablest and strongest minds of their time. They were the fertile minds, into which it was worth while

to drop seeds of new and higher thought. They were the leaders of their generation. That he was thus able to teach the teachers, to mould the thought of thinkers, and to sway so many master minds, is the secret of his great and growing influence, and the assurance that his work will live.

HIS GREATEST SERVICE TO RELIGION.

Perhaps the greatest single service that Dr. Martineau rendered to religion, was that of helping men in an age of great theological upheaval, caused by the unprecedented developments of science, to see that science and religion are not antagonistic, as so many believed, and that religion has nothing to fear from science, no matter what further scientific developments may arise. Science had made such rapid progress, and had brought to light so many facts which had contravened old-established theological theories and doctrines, that there was widespread alarm lest the very foundations of religious faith should be overturned. It was feared by many that the discovery of law ruling everywhere in nature, meant the dethronement of God. Others feared that the new science was sweeping away the whole spiritual universe (including both God and the human soul) and leaving us only a physical realm, or a uni-

verse of blind matter and motion. In the midst of this anxiety and alarm Dr. Martineau came forward calm and confident, maintaining, with a clearness of insight, a strength of reasoning, and a breadth and precision of knowledge, which at once commanded the attention of the thinking world, that law, so far from banishing God, is only a name for the method of God's universal activity; that materialism, so far from being formidable, and compelling us to give up belief in spirit, is nothing but pure assumption, with no basis of sound reason or of known fact to stand upon; that science, so far from destroying God, is only possible in a universe whose basal fact is Intelligence and Mind; and that there is nothing in either law or science that can in any way disturb religion, because religion has its foundation, not in irrational doctrines or unscientific creeds, and not even in sacred books, but in the deepest experiences of the soul of man. Thus did this great philosophic thinker render a service to religion which soon came to be recognized as second in importance to that of no religious teacher in the modern world.

A RADICAL.

Dr. Martineau was a theological radical. He was much more of a radical in his later life than

in his earlier. He tells us that, as the result of his studies and his own mental growth, he had found himself compelled, during his public career, to think out afresh, and to re-shape, at least twice, every part of his religious philosophy. In this he reminds us of the great scientist, Sir Charles Lyell, who, after he had written his greatest work on geology in what he intended to be its final form, went through the great labour of rewriting it, in the light of the new doctrine of evolution which had just risen on the world.

A CONSERVATIVE.

But if Martineau was a radical, he was also a conservative. There is a class of radicals who seem to be always trying to tear up by the roots the hopes and faiths of men. To this class Martineau did not belong. Rather was he the kind of radical who is always seeking to plant the roots of men's hopes and faiths deeper, and in richer soil. Such a radical is the true conservative.

Much that is thought of as Martineau's radicalism is connected with the doctrine of miracles. Men had long been building religion on a foundation of miracle, and claiming that it could have no other foundation. But Martineau saw that science was more and more

bringing miracles into discredit with many minds, and therefore threatening, for such minds, to overthrow religion. Hence he set himself to the task of finding a foundation other than miracle, deeper than miracle, which no fading away of miracle could affect. He found such a foundation in man's own moral and spiritual nature. This foundation was indestructible and eternal.

HIS CONSCIENTIOUSNESS AND COURAGE.

Dr. Martineau was a man of great independence, courage, and conscientiousness. Indeed, he was independent and brave because he was conscientious. His conscience was his commander. What it bade him do, that he did, at every hazard. Such obedience to conscience is always the truest heroism. His conscientiousness and bravery were shown by his taking the unpopular side in many things. They were shown by his keeping himself in steady and active alliance with a small religious body like the Unitarians. With his splendid gifts, if he had been in one of the larger religious denominations, especially in the National Church, he could have had any honour or distinction which England was able to bestow. But he would have despised himself with unutterable scorn if he had

detected himself turning aside even by a hair's breadth from the path of what he believed to be truth and right, for the sake of any possible honour or advantage.

HIS CATHOLICITY.

Few men have ever been so broadly catholic in spirit as Dr. Martineau. He saw good in all forms of religion; he discovered some precious element of truth hidden in the heart of even the most dark and repellent creed, and his desire was always to save the good, while casting out the evil. His catholicity made him unwilling to be cut off from any religious communion. Nothing could prevent him from at least extending his *sympathies* to all. Others might curse him; he would bless them. He felt that he had a possession in every religious prophet, and saint, and teacher, of whatever name. Augustine and St. Francis, and Luther and Calvin, and Wesley and Moody and Leo III. and Swedenborg, as well as the brethren of his own household of faith, all belonged to him, because he recognized the piety of all. And yet, with all his spiritual sympathy, he was the most unsparing of truth-tellers. He insisted on letting the light shine into all dark places. He would not compromise with superstition, with bigotry, with ignorance, with unethical concep-

tions of God, with degrading views of man, with irrational religious doctrines, in high places or low. While he would not knowingly injure any Church, however bad its theology, or deep the superstition in which it wrapped itself, he would endeavour to help and bless all, by doing whatever was in his power to show them higher truth and lead them out into larger life.

YOUNG TO THE LAST.

In his mind and heart Dr. Martineau never grew old. He kept his intellectual activity and his mental freshness through life. At the last there was some mental weakness, some loss of memory, but little or no loss of interest in new thought. In a letter written in his ninety-second year, he speaks of himself as not having desired old age, but God had sent it to him, and he had found it, rather to his surprise, something to be thankful for, something "deepening instead of impairing the supreme interest and significance of life." Some of his best writing was done after he was eighty; indeed, all three of his greatest books—"Types of Ethical Theory," "A Study of Religion," and "The Seat of Authority in Religion"—were put in final form and given to the public after he had reached that advanced age. This is some-

thing nearly or quite unprecedented in the history of the world. All this was possible because his thinking never became stereotyped. He was always ready to read new books, and to seek new standpoints from which to look at truth. His thought to the last was a flowing stream, it never became a stagnant pool; and the reason was, he was always pouring new water into the stream, and drawing water out of the stream. In this he may well be a lesson and an example to us all. Woe to any of us if we ever allow our minds to become pools; if we ever cease to read new books and take interest in fresh thought; if we stop growing; if we fail to keep our faces turned towards God's new and forever new sunrises.

I find myself compelled to regard Dr. Martineau as the greatest prophet, thinker, and teacher that the liberal faith has yet produced in the Old World, and as only equalled by Channing and Emerson in the New. Most of his thought I believe will live. Most of his teachings I believe will take root in the world and grow.

· FOLLOWING OUR LEADER.

God has greatly favoured us as a religious body by giving us such a leader as James Martineau. We ought to be profoundly grate-

ful for the gift. Such leadership should make us brave and strong.

One danger in connection with belonging to a small and unpopular religious movement like ours is, lest we grow timid and lose heart. But shall we be afraid because we are few? Shall we be dismayed by mere numbers? There have been single men who, pitted against the world, have become victors. Such were Galileo and Darwin in science. Such was Jesus in religion. With such leaders as Channing, and Emerson, and Martineau, and Jesus, what have we to fear? Men call us sceptics, unbelievers, and many another hard name. They deny that we have any right to a place in the company of Christians. Let us not be troubled. Persons who dare to stand for truth more advanced than that held by the majority of their fellows are always misunderstood, always have to bear opprobrium. What others have borne without complaint, why should we shrink from? Let us be calm and fearless as was Martineau.

A GREAT LIGHT.

Men like Martineau are splendid lights raised aloft on rocky headlands to guide the thought of the world in safety in its voyagings over the ocean of truth. All the future will think more

wisely and safely regarding the profoundest problems of human life and destiny because of what Martineau has thought and written.

Now while his name is upon all lips, while the public prints are recalling his life and doing honour to his greatness, it is a fitting time for all of us who love and honour him, to deepen our acquaintance with his writings. Let us see to it that his books are in our libraries. Let us familiarize ourselves with their contents. Let us lend them to others. Thus we can all do something to disseminate that light which God has let shine so brilliantly in him.

Not all men accept his thought; but the number that accept it increases, and will increase. He has been much misunderstood. But it is encouraging to see that he is less misunderstood and more held in reverence every decade. It is becoming increasingly hard to bar him from the Christian fold. Not a few who once denied his Christianity are beginning to say, Would God we were as good Christians as he! And it will be increasingly difficult as time goes on to refuse the Christian name and Christian fellowship to those men and those churches that represent the high faith that he taught and lived.

COURAGE!

It only remains to us to be faithful and courageous. If our position is sometimes lonely, what of that? To be in the same company with such souls as Martineau should be profoundly assuring. As he splendidly followed truth, let us follow him, and fear not.

DR. MARTINEAU'S
"STUDY OF RELIGION:"

AN ANALYSIS AND EPITOME.

BY

ELIZA R. SUNDERLAND, PH.D.

"Faith in our own faculties, as God has given them, is at the very basis of all knowledge and belief on things human or divine. Each one of our natural powers is to be implicitly trusted within its own sphere,—the senses as reporters of the outward world; the understanding, in the ascertainment of the laws and interpretation of nature; the reason and conscience, in the ordering of life, the discernment of God and the following of religion.

"Whoever tries to shake their authority, as the ultimate appeal in their several concerns, though he may think himself a saint, is in fact an infidel. Whoever pretends that anything can be above them,—be it a book or a church, is secretly cutting up all belief by the roots.

"Turn the matter as we may, it will appear that the fullest, most unqualified admission of a moral and rational nature in man, whose decisions no external power can overrule, and which constitutes God's ever open court for trying the claims of Scripture and prophecy, no less than philosophy, is the prime requisite of all devout faith; without which, duty loses its sacredness, revelation its significance and God himself his authority."—Martineau's "Endeavours."



Dr. Martineau's "Study of Religion:"

AN ANALYSIS AND EPITOME.

In this Centennial year of Dr. Martineau's birth, many friends and admirers will bring their tributes of love and admiration, as wreaths to crown the memory of one who has had so large and worthy a place in the world of religious thought. For the following study of what is perhaps Dr. Martineau's greatest work, the writer begs a humble place among these centennial offerings.

"A Study of Religion" was the second in order of appearing of three great philosophical treatises, the "Types of Ethical Theory" having preceded it by some three years, and the "Seat of Authority in Religion" following it after an interval of two years. These works have all taken their places among the valuable and permanent contributions of modern times to philosophical religious literature.

Probably the one of the three, however, which has met with widest favor,—a favor not confined at all to his own religious communion, but finding strong expression among the ablest thinkers of every religious name—is the

"Study of Religion." This luminous, widely suggestive, and in every way masterly work, may well be read and carefully studied by every intelligent believer in religion who has time for studies so extended and erudite. But alas! in a crowded age like ours, those who have time for careful and extended study, are only the favored few. The many must almost wholly pass by works like this of Dr. Martineau. It is for such, primarily, that the following Analysis and Epitome has been prepared.

A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE WHOLE BOOK.

Before entering upon our task, it will be helpful to place before us at a glance a general outline of Dr. Martineau's work. After briefly defining the word "Religion," he proceeds to discuss his great theme under the following heads:

I. What can man know?

II. What can the Intellect tell us of God as Cause?

III. What can the Moral Nature tell us of God as Holiness?

IV. The Unity of God as Cause and as Holiness.

V. Pantheism as a System of Thought Opposed to Belief in God.

VI. Determinism and Free Will as a System of Thought Opposed to Belief in God.

VII. *The Life to Come.*

With this introductory glance over Dr. Martineau's book as a whole, to get in mind its general scope, we are ready to proceed to our study and analysis of it, part by part, in the order indicated.

THE WORD "RELIGION" DEFINED.

What is Religion? "A worship of Humanity," answers Frederick Harrison. "Reverence for the Unknowable," answers Herbert Spencer. "Habitual and permanent admiration, and every form of enthusiasm, be they for science, for art or for morals," says the author of "Supernatural Religion."

These answers and others are examined by Dr. Martineau and rejected. His own definition is as follows: "*Religion is belief in and worship of an Ever-Living God; that is, of a Divine Mind and Will, ruling the universe and holding moral relations with mankind.*"

Religion thus defined is to be the subject of the following study.

I. WHAT CAN MAN KNOW?

At the very threshold of a study of religion as thus defined above, we are met with a philosophic question concerning the conditions of Human Knowledge. Certain expressions used in the definition given, namely, "an Ever-Living God," "a Divine Mind and Will," "moral relations between that Will and mankind," these are transcendental themes, not reporting themselves through the senses, and not capable of definition in terms of physical science. Can man, therefore, know them in any such sense as to justify religious belief?

Two classes of thinkers answer this question in the negative, namely: those known as Subjective Idealists; and those who accept the theory of the Relativity of Knowledge. These theories must, therefore, be investigated at the outset.

1. SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM.

Subjective Idealism holds that man can know nothing beyond his own ideas.

What is knowing? A kind of thinking; yet not all thinking is knowing, but only that kind which reports itself in the form of judgments. Of the two forms of judgment, the Analytic and Synthetic, only the latter proves adequate as an instrument for acquiring new knowledge;

but on analyzing a synthetic proposition we find that it resolves itself into variations of sense-perceptions or affections, and thus cannot give us knowledge of things external to itself. Is there any means of getting beyond the self in our knowing? If not, religion, as defined by Martineau, is an impossibility, since the mind cannot believe in what is absolutely beyond its knowledge.

In the investigation of this question of knowing, our author brings before us in critical review the theories of such thinkers as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Helmholtz and the Mills, father and son. Each of these philosophers, going to the human mind with this question of knowing, finds in the deliverances of that mind, not only mental states,—sensation, perception, etc.,—but a recognition of the ego and the non ego, i.e., a self and other than self (or an objective as well as a subjective world); a here and a there, or space; a now and a then, or time; phenomena and their cause, or causality; qualities, and the substance in which they inhere. Are all these,—an external world, time, space, causality,—anything more than ideas in the mind itself, and is there any proof that there is any external reality corresponding to them more than to the mental deliverances in dreams?

A careful analysis of the answer and grounds of the answer given by each of the writers named, together with an independent study of mental activity in an act of perception, leads our author to the conclusion that mind, the self, the ego, can know both self and other than self, an external object as well as internal subject.

2. THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE.

Having thus disengaged ourselves from the self-enclosure of subjective idealism, and owned the presence of objects not made by our own consciousness, what then? Though the outer world be no dream of our thought, but a real scene, conditioning our experience and affected by it, still what guarantee have we that it is what our belief represents it to be?

It is possible to say that that world can tell us only what our ways of thinking are shaped to admit. Our minds being constituted as they are, we think in our present fashion; were they constituted otherwise, we should think in a different fashion, though beyond us no corresponding change were made. We should in each case be liable to feel the same intuitive certainty; yet in one of them, perhaps in both, the trust would be illusory.

The possibility thus suggested that even our ultimate principles of cognition may be out of joint with reality and justify no predications about things as they are, has found a place both in ancient and modern philosophic writing. Appearing in various forms, as "Man the measure of all things," "All we know is phenomena," and the Spencerian doctrine of the "Unknowable," all the varieties may be summed up under the general head of the *Relativity of Human Knowledge*.

The grounds of this doctrine Dr. Martineau proceeds to investigate; premising however, that whatever efficiency the law of relativity may be supposed to have (as a caution against an illusory pretense of knowledge) must, in its application, tell impartially on the *whole field* claimed by the human intellect. It subjects our sensible apprehensions to precisely the same insecurity as our postulates of thought; so that our readings of phenomena have not the least advantage over our underlying ontological beliefs. If I am at the mercy of my own intellectual constitution when I trust my idea of space, of substance, or of cause, and of my moral constitution when I accept the reality of obligation, I am no less at the mercy of my percipient constitution when I register as facts, the forms,

the weights, the features, the movements of the physical world.

CONDITIONS OF KNOWING.

In all knowledge there must be two factors, a person to know and a thing to be known, and the knowledge resulting is the mode in which the constitution of the latter affects the faculty of the former. Knowledge is therefore a *relation* between the knowing subject and the known object, and *knowing* is *relationing in thought*. Of course these definitions shut the mind off from knowing what cannot enter into thought relations.

To talk of "knowing" "things in themselves," or "things as they are," is to talk of not simply an impossibility, but a contradiction; for these phrases are invented to denote what is in the sphere of *being* and *not* in the sphere of *thought*; and to suppose them "known" is *ipso facto* to take away their assumed character.

In like manner to talk of knowing the *absolute* involves a contradiction in terms, since *the absolute* means the *unrelated* and knowing is *relationing*. In being known, therefore, the absolute would cease to be the absolute. But in being debarred from knowing the absolute we

are not debarred from knowing *noumenon*, and *this*, not the absolute, is the antithesis of *phenomenon*.

ARE PHENOMENA THE LIMIT OF KNOWING?

A phenomenon is *an observed change*. To be a phenomenon therefore it must be observed or known. And it is further true that without phenomenon nothing could be known, since without change both the mind within us and the world before us would be locked in an eternal sleep, in which neither could communicate with the other. But this is not the same as saying that all we can know is phenomena.

In making us aware of the changes in and around us, phenomena can and do in every instance make us *also* acquainted with a *permanent ground*, the correlative of changes, without which they cannot be conceived, which is contained in their very meaning, and which has all the certainty belonging, not simply to their actual occurrence, but to their possibility. We know the changes by their turning upon this permanent; we know the permanent by the changes that break its uniformity; one and the same intellectual act therefore puts us in the presence of phenomenon and noumenon, change and permanence.

HERBERT SPENCER'S "UNKNOWABLE."

Even Herbert Spencer admits that it is impossible to present phenomena in thought or language without the assumption of entities to which they are related; especially without referring them to a Cause or Power whence they issue. Nay the very conception of them as Relative, and of relativity itself, he holds, involves at the other terminus of the way, the *Absolute* as a necessary cognition. He does not question the reality of these noumena; our thought, he says, does not delude us in its report of their existence; but there its capacity stops. We know *that* the absolute power is, but not *what* it is!

But is it possible to have assurance of a real existence, which yet remains to the end an utter blank? By calling this existence a *Power*, surely Mr. Spencer removes it by one mark from the unknowable. But further he says we are obliged to regard that power as "omniscient," as "eternal," as "one," as "cause manifested in all phenomena," a list of predicates which surely leaves it no longer "unknowable."

Having thus examined the modern doctrine of nescience or agnosticism with regard to metaphysical truth in its two forms, viz., the *idealism* which limits our knowledge to the in-

terior line of our own consciousness, and the principle of *the relativity of knowledge*, Mr. Martineau concludes that in no instance has the attempt proved satisfactory to explain away or render untrustworthy the intuitive beliefs which are the concomitants and conditions of our phenomenal experience.

INTUITIVE BELIEFS AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

With reference to the value of these intuitive beliefs, or of the intuitive witness borne by consciousness to the presence of a world beyond the contents of that consciousness, Mr. Martineau calls attention to a marked change in the canons of philosophical judgment. Till the middle of the last century the ultimate security of our knowledge was assumed to rest upon a few given or intuitive cognitions, not preceding experience, but elicited by our first experience and shaping it into a judgment.

It was generally agreed that, if any judgments could be shown to be original and intuitive, their authority must be considered beyond question, and what they told us be valid for the reality of things. Accordingly if a philosopher desired to weaken their authority, he proceeded—like Locke and Hume—to strip them of their *a priori* or intuitive pretensions, and reduce them to empirical rank. This is still the method most

in favor with the English empirical school, which is a virtual admission that if a judgment is to be impeached, it must be shown to be fabricated by experience, and that, so long as it can hold its ground as *intuitive*, it is entitled to be believed. Here we have a healthy faith remaining in the veracious structure of the human mind, and a willingness to trust its verdict so long as that verdict can be really had.

KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE DISCUSSED.

Since the time of Kant, however, a different canon has prevailed in Germany, and wherever the German philosophy has been dominant. Kant treated the *subjective* character of intuitions as their *condemnation*. They are forms, he held, in which we are made to think, and into which we must cast whatever of thought material is given us; they supply the law of our perceptive and intellectual life, and maintain it as a consistent and coherent system in itself; but that anything real corresponds with these forms, which lie in us and not in the world, we have not the smallest reason to believe.

To this Mr. Martineau answers: Neither have we the smallest reason to *disbelieve*: and *that*, as has been shown in a previous chapter, is indispensable for the justification of metaphysical

skepticism. To demand *a reason* for assent to a *primary* belief is to insist that it shall not be primary, but secondary. It is certainly impossible to *prove* that our thinking functions are organized in right relations with the scene in which they feel and act; and if any one chooses to suppose that they are sources of mere illusion, he must be allowed to enjoy his humor. But the older presumption will still prevail, that what is inevitably thought is in accord with what really is; and that intelligence is not the mere creator of a dream.

Our true course, therefore, is to avail ourselves of the empirical psychology to the limits of its honest analysis of acquired combinations; and beyond these limits to trust, as valid intuitions, the residual beliefs inherent in our mental constitution.

CONCLUSIONS.

The conclusions to which we have thus been led are:

(1) That the two sources of knowledge are intuitions and experience;

(2) That the former are primary beliefs, elicited by experience, and entitled to the same reliance as the phenomena apprehended with them in one act of thought;

(3) That through intuition the mind transcends the limits of self-knowledge and finds access to realities not apprehensible by sense-perception alone.

CAN THE HUMAN MIND KNOW GOD?

The way is thus open to the inquiry, What can the mind discover as to the one great central object of religious belief, namely, an Ever-living God holding moral relations to man?

All religion resolves itself into a conscious relation, on our part, to a higher than we; and, on the part of the rational universe at large, to a higher than all, i.e., to a Mind Supreme above the whole family of minds. The conditions of such Supremacy are two-fold:

(1) Dynamical, consisting in the command of all methods needful for the accomplishment of contemplated ends.

(2) Moral, consisting in the intrinsic ascendancy of the highest ends, infallibly conceived and externally pursued, as the springs of the Divine Will. In treating of the former we have to do chiefly with the relation of God to *Nature*, —the sole theatre of any possible power that can be supposed to limit or dispense with His. In treating of the latter, we deal with His relation to *Man*, and in a secondary degree to the

other sentient beings of our globe,—as the only sphere open to our observation in which character can play a part, and a righteous government appear.

These two fields really exhaust all that we can seek or really desire to know of things divine; for although to these two aspects, of God as *Cause*, and God as *Holy*, we might add a third, of God as *Judge*, in order to determine the question of a life reserved for us beyond death, yet this is evidently an integral portion of the moral problem embraced under the second head. *The two great problems before us, then, are, Do we find in nature traces of God as Cause, and in human nature and life similar proofs of the existence of a God of Holiness?*

In asking these questions we must needs go to the intellect and the moral nature respectively for our replies.

II. WHAT CAN THE INTELLECT TELL US OF GOD AS CAUSE?

Do we find in nature traces of a great First Cause, adequate for the needs of religion?

The idea of cause has possessed and engaged the human mind in every reflective age since the dawn of philosophic literature. In this literature the causal idea has appeared under at


least three distinct forms, namely: *Thing as Cause*; *Phenomenon as Cause*, and *Force as Cause*. The claims of each must be considered.

1. THING AS CAUSE.

If by *Thing* we denote whatever has definite position in space, the word belongs to whatever holds geometrical relations; and as these subsist wherever there are points, lines, and surfaces, with their angles and enclosures, things might be present in a world where no motion was. In a scene thus dead, however partitioned by marking objects, no one can pretend to find a *source of change*, i.e., a *real cause*. The tendency to invest external things as such, with causality, is traced back to the metaphysics of an earlier age, but was intensified by the influence of Spinoza, who treated logical necessity as identical with cause. But except as the seat of *change*, or partner in a *change*, no "thing" can ever play the part of *cause*.

2. PHENOMENA AS CAUSE.

Is it then a sufficient correction, to disregard things, as such, and seek cause in *another Phenomenon*, so that the relation shall be between two homogeneous members of the same series, differing simply as constant prior from constant



posterior! This is the doctrine of Hume, Brown, the Mills, and the empirical psychologists, generally, of England; of Kant in Germany; of Comte in France. They all reduce causality to a rule of time-succession traceable in the order of phenomena. Mr. Martineau, after reviewing the mode of reasoning by which Kant and others arrive at this time-succession idea of causality, by both reasoning and illustrations invalidates the theory, and proves that something else is necessary than order among phenomena before the mind sets up the belief of cause and effect.

3. FORCE AS CAUSE.

That something else is *Force* or *Power*. This form of the idea of causality is discussed at length, with the objections which have been urged against it. The conclusion reached is, that *Power* is postulated by the understanding as the operative condition of any and all change. So that the dynamic idea clings to causality throughout.

And this is *all* of the *necessary* content of the causal idea so long as cause and effect are contemplated by us as *spectators*. But from a position of mere receptivity, or of contemplative intelligence, man could never attain the idea of

causality. Not till he throws himself into the field as an *actor* or *doer* can he find the problem and try to solve it. The attempt to study causality from this experimental side leads to an analysis of an act of perception.

4. WILL AS CAUSE.

The arm is flung out towards the measure of its length; it is arrested by a book upon the table; if the initiative impulse is lively, it will not be balked, but redoubling itself will push the obstacle away and so complete itself. The contrast between the first pure spontaneity and the counteraction it receives, and again between the two intensities of energy on the change half-way, reveals itself at once in the moment of collision; for it is the impediment that serves as tell-tale of the free energy it stops. When the check is defied and thrown off, the movement assumes a new character and is thenceforth delivered over to the will.

THE SELF AND OTHER THAN SELF DISCOVERED IN AN ARREST OF WILL.

The fundamental discovery opened upon us in this experience is the dualism of the *self* and the *other than self*, both of which start into the field and divide between them the contents of

the percipient lesson. The arrested spontaneity, the attention turned upon the new feeling, the determined effort to persist in the movement, these we recognize as ours; while that which gives the feeling, and that which receives the energy are something other than ourselves.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS THE RESULT OF ARRESTED
WILL.

We are thus born into self-consciousness in the moment of disputed spontaneity, and instantly assert ourselves by taking into our own hands the power which before was only passing through our nature. And as it is a shock of interrupted feeling that gives us notice to do this, the feeling must have the same owner as the power; and both are necessarily referred to one point and taken home to the Ego, henceforth known as the subject both of the sensory store and of the forms of activity. These two heads exhaust all the possible contents of the Ego; all else than these contents is embraced in the non-Ego.

ARRESTED WILL THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF
CAUSE AND EFFECT.

This one comprehensive antithesis, besides giving account of the distinction between the self and the not self, also gives account of Causality, internal and external; of Space,—*here* for the self, *there* for the not self; of Time (after more than one perception); and of self-identical existence or Substance in antithesis with changing Phenomena,—and all these, not as sequent inferences from the percipient act, enriching it by new discoveries, but as *contained in its own meaning*, yet admitting of separate expression. Of these, the most obvious is the relation of *Cause and Effect*, the cradle of which we here reach.

It is evident that if the foregoing exposition be correct, the Ego and non-Ego are known to us *ab initio* as reciprocally limiting powers put forth by antagonistic agents, and causing changes in some recipient object. If I know myself at all, it is in *trying* with all my might to do something needed but difficult, as for example to heave away a retarding resistance. While thus withstood and yet determined to persist rather than desist, I am conscious of exercising a *causal will* to institute or sustain efficient movement. Here, as Dr. Martineau thinks

(and he quotes other philosophic writers of note as sustaining the opinion) our first notions of *causality* are formed. "We ourselves," says Zeller, "are the one only cause, of whose mode of action we have immediate knowledge through inner intuition. For his notion of causality, man is at the outset guided by no other clue than the analogy of his own willing and doing."

CAUSE AND WILL IDENTICAL.

If we are thus absolutely dependent, continues Dr. Martineau, on this single inner intuition, for knowledge of what causality is, it must fill and constitute our whole idea of it and of the way in which effects arise; nor can anything ever be added to it, as there are no other sources which can tell us anything about it. It determines the meaning of the word cause, and determines it forever. That meaning is power in the form of will.

When, by an *a priori* axiom of the understanding, we apply this causal relation to the external world, in the act of perception, we must carry this meaning too. Through such act of perception as has been analyzed, we are introduced to the world, not as to a dead thing, or a material aggregate of things, but to another self, just as causal as we, instinct with hidden Will, and so

far presenting the outer and inner spheres in true equipoise.

In the dualism, then, which perception opens to us, we are placed under an irrepealable thought-necessity of the following kind: Here at home in the Ego, we have first hand acquaintance with Causality; and we find it to be Will. In the reaction of objects upon us we know their resistance to be simply the inverse or opposite of our own causality, and so we recognize in them the same attribute (causal Will) by which we ourselves have moved forth upon them. Not till we put forth and direct our own causality, whether simply percipient or motory, have we revelation of the causality of the world; and our immediate feeling of operative Will in the exercise of our own causality, we, by a necessary law of thought, reflect and must ever reflect upon the outer world.

Since Will is necessarily identical with the inmost essence of the sole causality known to thought, we cannot do otherwise than read Will into the causality manifested by the non-Ego, as what would be stirring in us, if we could change places with it; cause then means that which can settle an alternative, viz., a disposing Will, by Will being meant *choice between two alternative directions of activity*.

This ultimate identity of meaning in the words Cause and Will, and the dependence of the former upon the immediate consciousness of the latter, are indirectly attested by the frequent recurrence of even the most practiced scientific intellects to the springs of human action as the true key to the dynamics of outward nature; and yet in one respect the language of science seems at first sight to contradict the idea of *one* causal Will in nature. The textbooks of science speak of a *plurality* of forces, while our psychological analysis has given *one* Will in the outer world as the antagonist of the Will in the conscious Ego. Yet even this seeming contradiction promises to disappear under the law of "The Conservation of Forces."

HOW ACCOUNT FOR THE INITIAL STEP IN THE CAUSAL PROCESS?

The question still presses, however, how can we work out with a single cause, an adequate explanation of nature's diversified effects? Homogeneous power will account for nothing in particular, because accounting for all things alike. If we refer everything to Divine Will, and define Will as "choice between two alternatives" we have not explained why one is taken and the other left. In this respect the

phenomenal theory of causation would seem to have the advantage, save for the more serious defect, that, in the phenomenal theory, there is involved *no idea of causality at all*. The difficulty we are trying to meet is how to account for the initial step, in the causal process, out of the indeterminate into the determinate. But this the mechanical theory of causality finds as great a difficulty as does the dynamic. Beginning with "thing" or "phenomenon" as cause, there must be a cause of that cause, and you start upon a process to which there can be no end except by arbitrarily cutting off further retreat by setting up a definite somewhat to start from. In assuming intelligent Will as the given starting point, we have at least provided something which we know, and which *seems* to have precisely what we want, the power of determining the contingent, of selecting among possibles that which shall become actual. As a personal decision is felt to explain an act and leave no more to be said, so is an eternal living Will the simplest conception we can form of the Universal Cause, itself uncaused.

HOW RECONCILE DYNAMIC WILL WITH THE LAWS OF NATURE ?

Another practical question may arise just here, namely: How are we to reconcile scientific generalizations with this dynamic theory of causation? Light will be thrown upon this question by tracing the natural history of the causal idea.

We find primitive man, in conformity with the primitive intuition, ascribing every conspicuous change on the earth or in the heavens, or in the lot of those around him, to a distinct and definite act of a will-directed power. All nature was at first alive with immediate volitional power, which was classed as propitious or adverse according as it brought good or ill to man. But this state of things could not continue. It was seen that the same act or object might produce mixed or even opposite effects on human beings; some other classification must be sought, and in the seeking came the grouping of phenomena, replacing multifarious and fluctuating volitions by a few great lines of purpose, designated later as laws.

Every law represents one thought, and is the explicit unfolding of one comprehensive and standing volition; it constitutes therefore a sin-

gle genus of power, which will not swerve till all its contents be delivered. In relation to its origin, it is still an act of Will settling what was indeterminate before; in relation to its effects it is a dynamic constant, an invariable necessity, and, when we look away from its source, it is a *force of nature* which can be depended upon to lend itself to our computation.

Thus what in one aspect is a *Divine Idea* in another is a *natural force*; and it is simply by forgetting the upper relation and shutting our attention up within the lower, that we pass from the free religious conception to the ministrative and scientific.

CAN A CAUSAL WILL BE RECONCILED WITH SCIENTIFIC GENERALIZATION AND CAUSATION?

But, the Force having taken the form of a general law, what is it that determines the phenomenon to happen so and so and not otherwise, under this law? The results of the law are now calm, now stern, now life, now death; why? Plato found answer by resorting to a dualism which involved the eternity of matter.

Without such resort, answer may be found on purely volitional ground in the mingling encounter of many dynamic acts which together would constitute a vast assemblage of powers,

each of which would yield its own series of effects, and the actual phenomena as we see them in the universe to-day would be the resultant of these crossing or intersecting powers. We thus gain the idea of the *conditions* of an event as supplementary to its cause. The visible processes of the natural world thus bear the same relation to its originating mind that our linked and co-ordinated organic movements, in accomplishing a purpose determined upon by us, bear to our volitional causality.

Thus by the education of nature itself, the human mind is led over the whole interval between its earliest habit of seeing distinct and separate deities in each object and activity of nature, and its latest version of scientific generalization and causation, without being called on to part from the essence of its original faith. From Will at the fountain head, not a single thing is wrested at any stage of the process; only, the inner acts of that Will are thrown into a new order, are reduced to a few comprehensive heads, and organized into a system, of which the sciences are the reflection in little. The emergence from superstition which marks this process consists, not in the *expulsion* of *purpose* from any scene which it occupied before, but in the substitution of *larger* purpose for *less*, of

plan for impulse. And as the primitive power has not been lost on the way, neither has any other been found; so that we are still in presence of the originating Mind, whose organizing thoughts are prototypes of the rules of nature.

VOLITIONAL METHODS IMPLY ENDS AND SUBORDINATION OF MAJOR TO MINOR ENDS. DO WE FIND THESE IN NATURE?

In counting off each mode of force as if it were a single creative volition, we have assimilated our conception of the Supreme Mind to that of a perfect scientific intellect; that is to say, we find ourselves in the presence of a Being who thinks out the universe, the general laws of which form the methods and calculus of his mind. But is this all?

Such a world would comply with *one* of the marks of Will, it would constitute a determinate system selected from indeterminate possibilities; but two other marks would be wanting, namely, its independent lines of action would converge upon no *end* beyond themselves, for the sake of which we must conceive them to be; and, there could be no *subordination of minor to major ends*, forming the scheme into a *hierarchy of good*. These additional marks, however, are not wanting in the universe.

In the mechanical and chemical departments of nature the relation between means and ends is still inchoate and obscure; as soon, however, as we enter the field of *organic* existence, and especially when we reach *sentient* beings, such real individualities are distinctly set up, that it is impossible not to allow each to carry its own end in itself, for the sake of which (as well as to serve the whole) it has been brought upon the scene.

Conscious intelligences, then, are the consummation of the forces and activities of terrestrial nature, the *end* to which all *lead up*. Thus all nature stands before us replete with marks of causal volition. The *laws* of nature are volitional *methods*; *sentient beings* are volitional *ends*, reached through many gradations of subordinate ends.

TELEOLOGY OR THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN.

To discover how far nature in its entire extent carries marks of volitional, that is purposeful, causality, is the object of Teleology, or the so-called Argument from Design. To this inquiry Dr. Martineau gives something over a hundred pages, discussing the place of teleology, teleological theism, the alleged blemishes in nature which would seem to disprove the argu-

ment from design, and the objection to teleology on the ground of its being anthropomorphic.

If *will* supplies whatever meaning there is in the word causality, and must itself be taken to include intention, we are led by an *a priori* necessity, to look upon the universe, no less than upon the person of a fellow man, as pervaded by intellectual power; and must assume purpose to be everywhere. Where then is there any need to seek for particular examples of it, such as would constitute what is called the argument from design? There would be none, perhaps, if design in nature were everywhere seen at a glance; but many facts and adjustments of nature can only be resolved into their significance by help of a well verified key, and to find and fit such a key is the province of teleology.

Descartes objected to our seeking to investigate the ends for which God has created the world, because, "We must not be so presumptuous as to think God has chosen to take us into his counsels." A reply is at hand: that it cannot be presumptuous to investigate those ends which are open to everybody's view, and which redound to the glory of God their author. The justifying object then of teleological inquiry is to ascertain whether the world answers, in its

constitution, to our intuitive interpretation of it as the manifestation of intellectual purpose.

SIGNS OF VOLITIONAL PURPOSE IN NATURE.

If there be volitional or purposeful causality in nature, man could only detect it by finding there the signs or marks which would indicate causality in himself. There are three such marks, namely: (1) Selection; (2) combination; (3) gradation of arrangement.

1. SELECTION.

As to selection, science has demonstrated its existence under the term "natural selection"; through "accidental variations" adds the scientist who rejects design; through a steady selection of one out of many possibles, replies the advocate of design or intention in nature. If it can be shown that nature improves her inhabitants by preserving all useful variations and selects only for the good of the being she tends, there is surely something more than accident here. A study of nature almost anywhere, as for example, in the ears and eyes of animals adapted for different habitats, as air and water, and for different modes of life, as hunted and hunting animals, will furnish a strong argument that such are nature's methods.

2. COMBINATION.

The question of combination, or combined action in nature is treated by Cuvier in his law of the "*correlation of organs*." Says Cuvier, "Every organized being forms a whole,—a peculiar system of its own, the parts of which mutually correspond and concur in producing the same definitive action by a reciprocal reaction. None of these parts can change in form without the others also changing; and consequently, each of them taken separately indicates and ascertains all the others. Thus by having a single bone, a person who possesses an accurate knowledge of the laws of organic economy, may reconstruct the whole animal. The smallest articulating surface has a determinate character, relative to the class, the order, the genus, and the species to which it belongs; insomuch that, when one possesses merely a well preserved extremity of a bone, he can, by careful examination and the help of a tolerable anatomical knowledge, and of accurate comparison, determine all these things with as much certainty as if he had the entire animal before him." Cuvier adds: "I have often made trial of this method upon portions of known animals, and it has always proved so completely satisfactory

that I have no longer any doubt regarding the certainty of the results which it has afforded me."

The same law which Cuvier announces as "correlation of organs," Darwin treats under "correlation of growth." "The whole organism," says Darwin, "is so tied together during its growth and development, that when slight variations in any one part occur, and are accumulated through natural selection, other parts become modified." In the majority of such correlations, we recognize without difficulty a combination of provisions to a single type of life.

Certain forms of combinations reach beyond the individual organism to its environment. And here we feel more clearly the presence of design or purpose. The eye and ear may be taken as examples of such design. The eye is to be used exclusively in the light, yet it is formed in darkness. The ear would be useless without air, yet it was formed in a silent, airless chamber.

A yet higher type of combination is found between one living being and another, as in the mammal's method of feeding its young; the fertilization of plants by insects; the beetle's arranging for the sustenance of the progeny it shall never see; the division of labor in the beehive between drones, workers and the queen bee.



3. GRADATION OF ARRANGEMENT.

The third mark of intentional action is *gradation of arrangement*, by which a given end is reached through a *train* of independent means, each making provision for the next till the series is consummated.

Such arrangement is seen in plant life, which, taking up inanimate matter from the earth, elaborates it into life substance, builds it into tissue of roots, stem, leaves and flowers, and finally into seeds having the power of reproduction.

The same gradation of arrangement is seen in adaptation of vegetable life to the sustenance of animal life, and animal life itself to the sustenance of higher types of animals. In man, finally, the appetites that wake his energies, the passions that drive away assailing ills, the affections that take him out of himself in devotion to others, the sentiments that draw him to truth, beauty and goodness, fall into their place, the lower subordinated to the higher till a moral ideal is reached.

OBJECTIONS STATED AND ANSWERED.

Thus we have found in nature all the marks which would indicate purpose in human activity, and a unity of idea in such purpose, which

stamps it as proceeding from a single mind. But when we begin to study this mind through analogy to the human mind, that is, through the argument from design, many thinkers find serious objections to the method as inadequate. Kant argues that, as human skill consists in subduing given materials and moulding them to its own purposes, to speak of *adaptations* in nature, similarly presupposes, as data to be adapted, the properties and laws of matter used in realizing the end, and leaves room merely for an *Architect* of nature instead of a *Creator*; and from this architect we could not reason to *Almightiness, unconditional perfection* and the *totality of being* which we require in the Author of nature. But it needs to be borne in mind that what we are searching for by means of the argument from design is not Almightiness, or Perfection, or totality of Being, but *signs of thought* in nature, and these must be sought amid a *scene of things*. In proving, therefore, an Architect of nature, the argument has attained its end.

But, it is further urged, in proving design in nature do you not separate the Designer from the world and leave Him outside? Why outside? it may be answered, why not inside? "Take," says Aristotle, "the case of a phy-

sician healing himself, and you have the mode in which nature proceeds." Neither theism nor the theory of design are committed to a God external to the world.

"At least the theory of design limits God's almightiness," still urges the objector. If almighty, why not create by divine fiat? Granted that the method by design is a limitation; since it is a *self-limitation* it cannot detract from Almightyness. Still further, if we are looking for mind in nature, that can only appear through an orderly evolution by way of means. Creation by Divine fiat would mean the repeal of all law, and the reduction of all phenomena to incoherent surprises.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM.

A weightier and more widespread objection to Teleology is its Anthropomorphism.

What is anthropomorphism? The original meaning of the word was: The ascription to God of a human form and members. With this meaning the early Christians charged it upon the heathen. But, by the usage of more recent times, it is made to cover the recognition of any quality, however spiritual, as common to the Divine and human.

With different writers the offense begins at different points. In order to avoid it Theodore Parker forbids us to say that God thinks, but allows us to say that he loves; Matthew Arnold will not allow that he either thinks or loves; while Professor Huxley charges Mr. Darwin with being anthropomorphic, because he leaves the Supreme Being answerable for at least one primordial cell with which to start the evolution series.

Is it then contended that, by simply being present in man, an attribute is disqualified from being referred to God? This can hardly be maintained by any one who is content to speak of the Supreme Power or the universal Cause of nature, for, as has been shown, no suspicion could arise within us of power and causation, but for our own conscious exercise of will.

There are but three forms under which it is possible to speak of the Immanent Principle of the universe; namely: mind, life and matter, because these cover all the fields of man's knowledge. Given the first, and the universe is intellectually thought out. The second, it blindly grows; the third, it mechanically shuffles into equilibrium. But since man is a sharer in all these forms, having mind and life in a material body, to consider nature under the form of

matter, or life, is just as anthropomorphic as to consider it under mind; so that the severest science is, in this sense, just as anthropomorphic as the most ideal theology.

If then we believe in any Divine First Cause in nature, and if nature cannot be approached from any side except through the ascription of some attribute of the human, where shall we draw the line of allowable ascriptions? The very scale of God's existence undoubtedly forbids us to carry into our idea of Him more than a few supreme attributes of our own nature. Between an eternal being and a mortal, one self-existent and one of borrowed powers, an ever perfect and a progressive mind, a will above and one within the sphere of temptation, a vast range of dissimilarity exists, and justifies the caution against humanizing our religious conceptions. But surely we are within limits when we ascribe to him the selection and execution of pre-conceived ends. That which in us is memory, and foresight and apprehension of rational relations, must have some intellectual equivalent in him.

Granted, it is further urged, that we may ascribe to God causality and intellect, the peculiar mode of using these, insisted on as evidence of design, is unworthy the Author of

Nature. Spinoza declares it an infringement of the perfection of God to suppose he acts for an *end*. And John Stuart Mill finds only weakness in the use of *means*. But it is to be noted that Spinoza's objection presses equally, if at all, upon every theory, not excepting his own, of the genesis of things from an infinite cause; and, to Mill's objection, it may be answered, that however instantaneous the Omniscient thought, however sure the Almighty power, the execution has to be distributed in time, and must have an order of consecutive steps. On no other terms can the Eternal become temporal, and the Infinite articulately speak in the finite. The proposal to skip all means in reaching ends ignores the problem instead of solving it.

DOES NATURE AS A WHOLE DISPROVE DESIGN?

Objectors to Teleology maintain that nature, except in a few picked instances, does not confirm, but contradicts the theory of design. In urging this objection reference is made to various useless and unmeaning arrangements, such as rudimentary organs, having form without function, defective organs as the eye, positively harmful arrangements as the sting of a bee which cannot be withdrawn without causing the death of the insect, conditions of birth and

death, etc. All these Dr. Martineau carefully considers and answers in such a way as to leave unshaken his faith in Teleology, but the limits of this paper forbid a restatement of the answers to the numerous specific examples cited. Those who are interested in the argument will do well to study it at first hand as Dr. Martineau presents it.

IMPLICIT ATTRIBUTES OF GOD AS CAUSE.

Having attempted thus far to set forth, and to surround with adequate protection, the first psychological source of Theism, namely, the recognition of a living Will and Intelligence as causes of the phenomena of the world, our author now asks us to accept this position as determined, and to pass into its interior and examine what its contents are. What does it enable us to say respecting the Being whom it reports to us as an ascertained object of thought?

1. OMNIPOTENCE.

To identify original Causality with God is to ascribe to him *all power*, for the terms are interchangeable. And by this we must mean that he is mighty for absolutely all things. This results from the principle with which we start. All causality being volitional and selective, the

line of realized action (i.e., the universe as it now exists) is only one out of a plurality of possibilities, and the cosmos which has come into being is but a sample of an unknown number that might have been.

2. UNITY.

Unity as well as universal power must be reckoned among the attributes of this causal Divine Will, since, among other reasons, the very idea of a world or universe, as a whole, is rigorously impossible, except on the assumption of a substantive unity incompatible with diverse origins and independent directions.

3. INTELLIGENCE.

We must declare God to be *intelligent*; for the pre-conception of ends and the realization of them by the apparatus of appropriate means are the characteristics of rational existence.

4. INFINITY.

We must also include *infinity* among His attributes, not, however, as a direct but as an indirect inference. The cosmos we cannot affirm to be infinite, hence we cannot infer from it as an effect the infinitude of God as Cause. From this we can only speak of the Divine perfections as indefinitely great. But we have predicated

space as the self-existent *condition* of the primary Causality, and space we can affirm to be infinite; and as it is impossible to maintain a disparity of scope between the cause and the condition of all things, they share the same dimensions; so that, though we cannot directly infer the infinitude of God from a limited creation, indirectly we may exclude every other position by resort to its unlimited scene of existence.

5. ETERNITY.

By a similar method we may justify the *eternity* of God as Cause. If there was ever a time in which as yet this cause was not, it has *come into being* and is therefore only a phenomenon or effect, which is a simple contradiction. Its existence, as other than phenomenon, is its essential feature as a causal explanation of phenomena; it cannot therefore have had a beginning, but must always have been; nor can it have an end, for this also would reduce it to a phenomenon.

To sum up, then, the results reached through the principle of Causality: There is one universal Cause, the infinite and eternal seat of all Power, an omniscient Mind, ordering all things for ends selected with perfect wisdom.

III. WHAT CAN THE MORAL NATURE TELL US OF GOD AS HOLINESS?

In seeking the basis of religious belief in the constitution of human nature, we have thus far interrogated only the Intellectual Faculties, and these have given us one universal Cause, the infinite and eternal seat of all power, and an omniscient Mind ordering all things for ends selected with perfect wisdom.

Were we simply intellectual free agents, devoted wholly to the study of external nature, here our religious apprehensions would stop. But man is something more than an intellectual, he is also a moral being, and the moral side of his constitution must now be consulted.

If there be a world beyond the Ego, material for perception, intellectual for thought, moral and spiritual for conscience, evidently it can be apprehended only through its relation to these powers. If it is there to speak at all, it is to them it must speak, and their report will be our only source of information. That report is called *an intuition*. We have seen what it gives us in the case of *volitional* experience, namely: an *objective causality*; by a parallel presentation in the case of *moral* experience, we shall find that it gives us an *objective authority*; both

alike being objects of immediate knowledge, on the same footing of certainty as the apprehension of the external world; there being no logical advantage which the belief in finite objects around us can boast over the belief in the Infinite and Righteous Cause of all.

MORAL CLAIMS ARE AUTHORITATIVE AND UNIVERSAL.

The fundamental form which the Moral Intuition takes had been fully considered by Dr. Martineau in his "Types of Ethical Theory" and is therefore only briefly treated in the present work. The essential characteristics of the Moral Intuition are the following: Whenever two incompatible springs of action simultaneously urge us, there is an attendant consciousness of superior excellence in one of them; an excellence not in point of pleasure or advantage which it were wise to take; not in respect of seemliness and beauty which it were tasteless to decline; but in the scale of *right*, which, in carrying our assent, commands our obedience.

All these kinds of superiority it is open to us to disregard, but at the cost, in the first two cases merely of personal inferiority; in the third of a mysterious haunting disloyalty.

Accusing ourselves of this, we are aware that our offence is not a private mistake to be set-

tled with in our home account, but one that looks beyond ourselves and infringes rights that are not our own; and we are visited by more than shame at failure, or regret at folly; we are cast down in severe compunction under a very different sense of *guilt*.

The superior terms in the scale of values which appeal to the conscience do not court us by their charms and graces, but claim us by their *authority*; tell us that we *ought* to follow them; that they are *binding* on us; that in neglecting them we *sin*; that they are offered to our option *by a Higher than we*. To conform our voluntary life to the preferential scale of obligation, as it emerges into consciousness, is our *duty*, for the observance of which we are *responsible*.

This is the circle of ideas in which the conscience lives and moves, and which supplies the moral nature with a sphere of cognition special to itself. These ideas are intelligible to all men; they flow into every language and give it half its force and fire; they are the preamble of all law, and the pervading essence of the higher religions. These ideas are uniform in all men,—the seeming discrepancies of ethical judgment clearing themselves away as we push back the comparison from external actions to the in-

ternal springs, and see that the same problem is really present to the differing minds. In proportion as the springs of action have strength within us according to their worth, we are at peace with ourselves and conscious of a secret harmony. And by the same rule it is that we estimate each other, pouring indignation on the man whom no call of compassion can snatch from his selfish ease; watching with enthusiasm the hero from whose lips no terror can extract a betrayal or a lie; looking up with reverence to the saintly mind in which all discords cease and the higher affections reign without dispute.

MORAL LAW, EXTERNAL AND IMPERATIVE.

What means this scale of relative excellence which gives an order of rank to our various impulses, and frames them into a hierarchy, with the moral at the summit? Since these impulses exist, have they not all a right to be? And are they not all on equal footing? What entitles any one of them to put on airs towards its companions and to claim superiority?

One step in the determination of this question can be taken without challenge. The moral order is not arbitrary, in the sense of being a personal accident, or individual prejudice; it exists irremovably in each, and with consensus

in all. This is the peculiarity of all properly moral verdicts, that they are not the expression of individual opinions, which we work out for ourselves by sifting of evidence; but the *enunciation of what is given us ready-made*, and has only to *pass through us into speech*.

We may indeed debate within ourselves the claims presented in this or that line of outward action, because the choice of action has to be determined not by the principle that issues it, but by the effects that follow it. These are amenable to the calculus of the understanding, without resort to which the action cannot be rational; but, so long as the prior problem is before us, of securing the right spring of conduct, we have nothing to seek by logical process, but only to give forth what we find. In other words the intuition of conscience is: that the moral law is *imposed by an authority foreign to our personality*, and is open not to be canvassed but only to be *obeyed or disobeyed*.

MORAL CLAIMS NOT AN EMBODIMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION.

What is that foreign authority which thus demands our allegiance? "It is an embodiment of public opinion, an ideal aggregate of sentiment made up of all the praise and blame which

men bestow on what helps or hurts their interests." So answer one class of writers, including such names as Hobbes and James Mill.

The arguments by which this school of men attempt to prove that the Moral Law is nothing but the grotesque shadow of public opinion looming fearfully upon our thought, is fully examined by Dr. Martineau, and the conclusion reached that "The springs of action are not differentiated by men's interested preferences among them; but have an order of claim which is seated in the constitution of things, and belongs to them wherever they appear on the theatre of a voluntary nature; these inherent differences are reported to us and urged upon us by *some objective power*, with which their validity is *identified*, and the self-interest of society is *not* that power."

MORAL LAW THE FINITE RECOGNITION OF AN INFINITE OBJECTIVE PERFECTION.

Whither, then, shall we turn to find this objective power? Dr. Martineau answers in a dozen carefully reasoned pages which we summarize (of course inadequately) as follows: The cognitions we gain through the ordinary exercise of the senses, are perfectly analogous in their mode of origin, to those which come to us

through the moral faculty. In the act of perception we are immediately introduced to an *other than ourselves that gives what we feel*; in the act of conscience we are introduced to a *Higher than ourselves that gives us what we feel*. The externality in the one case, the authority in the other, the causality in both, are known upon exactly the same terms, and carry the same guarantee of their validity.

The dualism of perception, which sets ourselves in the face of an objective world, and the dualism of conscience which sets us in the face of an objective Higher Mind are perfectly analogous in their grounds. It is the specific sense of *Duty* that constitutes a dual relation. This cannot belong to a soul *in vacuo*, but must be forever a disconsolate and wandering illusion till it *rests with Him to whom the allegiance belongs*. In other words the Moral Law reaches its integral meaning when seen as *impersonated in a Perfect Mind*, which communicates it to us, and lends it power over our affections sufficient to draw us into Divine communion.

IMPLICIT ATTRIBUTES OF GOD AS MORAL LAW.

The form which theism assumes when developed from Moral Law differs widely from that which is given by the principle of Causal-

ity. There the Divine scene was outward in the cosmos; here, it is inward in the human soul. There the Divine agency was seen in natural law; here, it is seen in the moral law. There, consequently, its order was that of invariable necessity; here, it is that of variable possibility and freedom. What are the attributes of the Divine agency as revealed by conscience and Moral Law?

1. God, relatively to us, is now identical with our *Highest*, the eternal life of Moral Perfection. Hence, we cannot but ascribe to him *Benevolence towards sentient beings; Justice toward moral beings*, i.e., a treatment of them according to character; and *Amity towards like minds*, however vast the moral distance between them.

2. But the revelations of our moral nature do not close here. Through it we discover that God stands in *one relation to all* human beings, giving the same warnings, ordaining the same strife, inviting the same affections, breathing the same inspirations. Hence, the knowledge of Him and the life in Him, emerge from the level of a solitary faith, and become a principle of union; and our united human life is recognized as constituting *a Kingdom of God*; life has no binding laws that are not His; no offenses that



are not sins; no just penalties that are not expressions of His Will; no noble passages of history that are not the march of His advancing Providence.

IV. THE UNITY OF GOD AS CAUSE AND GOD AS HOLINESS.

We have now sought an origin for our primary religious ideas on two sides of our nature, the Intellectual and the Moral, and found an Infinite Will, first in the principle of Causality, then in the intuitions of Conscience. From the first, we obtained as attributes of the Divine Nature, Intelligence, Power, Self-Existence; from the second, Benevolence, Justice, Holiness and sovereign Government of men. Each brings us to the presence of an Eternal Being.

But are these Beings *one* and *the same*? What we find true of the Creator may we affirm of the Righteous Judge? Have we any sufficient reasons for identifying the Causal God with the Holy God? Yes; these at least:

1. We ourselves unite, in our own persons, a subjection to both the outward physical order and to the inward moral law, in a way which baffles all attempt to discriminate them as two factors combined as the result of partnership.

We are, on one hand, *natural objects*, on the other, *moral beings*; indeed our very probation, as moral, consists in managing ourselves as animal.

2. Our instinctive springs of action are themselves awakened by the external world and have reference to aspects and changes there. Conscience, with all its insight, can think nothing and do nothing in empty space; it waits for the data of life and humanity; and all its problems are set by the conditions of the world.

3. That external nature is not foreign to the system of moral laws, is further evident from the fact that, to a considerable extent, it administers their retribution and enforces their discipline; witness the ruined health of the intemperate, the repulsive physiognomy of the selfish. Thus the end toward which moral and physical laws, alike, look and work, are ethical, and the Divine Causality places itself at the disposal of the Divine Perfection: *eternal Thought moves in the lines of eternal Holiness.*

CAN PAIN AND EVIL BE HARMONIZED WITH DIVINE
GOODNESS?

Is the conclusion which has been reached above verified when carried into the sphere of outward things? The scheme of things in which we live admits:

1. Suffering,—pains from want, pains of decline, pains from the physical elements, pains from the predaceous mode of life;

2. Moral evil or sin, and

3. It is charged with exhibiting the at least seeming abandonment of human history to the conflicts of rude force. Can these things be reconciled with our recognition of an infinite moral perfection in the constitution and administration of the world?

To many readers no part of Dr. Martineau's exhaustive treatise will have so vital interest as the eighty pages in which these objections to the belief in a moral order in the universe are answered and the belief justified. We can do no more than hint at their contents.

LIFE IS A GOOD, DESPITE THE EVIL?

The possibilities of pain inherent in the organism are of two kinds: those which as wants—hunger, thirst, fatigue—work the organism, and those which set in at last when the organism can no longer be worked. Of the former all can see the reason and value. The uneasiness of appetite and passion trains the animal to mastery over the world, and enriches the earth with higher forms of life developed through the struggle for existence. Is it charged as a cruel

feature in the competition for existence, that the halt and feeble lose their footing on the world and are exiled from life? This judgment is itself a vindication of the Creator. The life given, with all its pains, is a good which it is a hardship to lose.

COULD NOT AN ALMIGHTY GOD HAVE PREVENTED
EVIL?

The sufferings which set in when the organism can be no longer worked is a harder problem. Had nature provided the winding up with an anæsthetic, what harm would be done? The phenomena of disease among the lower animals, too, are perplexing facts. They are present, it is plain, *in spite of* the normal purpose of the structure they disturb, relatively to which they must be regarded as *undesigned* imperfection. However, they may be embraced within some larger project in whose paramount good their partial evils vanish. Does some one ask, What business have imperfections in the work of an infinite Being? Has he not power to bar them out?

Dr. Martineau replies, Yes, if he lives out of his boundless freedom, and, from moment to moment, acts unpledged, conducting all things by the miscellany of incalculable miracles, there

is nothing to hinder his Will from entering "where it listeth" and all things will be possible to him. But if once he commits His Will to any determinate method, and, for the realization of his ends, selects and institutes a scheme of instrumental rules (or laws), he thereby shuts the door on a thousand things that might have been possible before; He has defined His cosmical equation, and only those results can be worked out from it which are compatible with the value of its roots. It is in vain, therefore, to appeal to the almightiness of God, unless you mean to throw away the relations of any established universe, and pass into his unconditioned infinitude or chaos. In the Cosmos he has abnegated that Almighty in behalf of law. The limits, it is true, are *self-imposed*, but, in order to any determinate action at all, *some* limits had to be assigned; and unless you can show that to a different scheme better possibilities attached themselves, criticism is out of order.

SOME EVILS ARE NECESSARY ACCOMPANIMENTS OF
A LARGER GOOD.

No disasters have a more appalling aspect, or seem to make more cruel sport of life, than those produced by the earthquake, the volcano, the

geyser,—convulsions that contradict the very solidity of the world; but all these are remnants of the planet-making which still goes on; which has advanced far enough to offer some habitable land, but not far enough to ensure against eruptions and cavings in. But surely there was nothing to deter a beneficent Creator from opening the story of sentient existence ere the crust of the earth had settled in its last security.

If we are asked to reconcile blizzards, and cyclones, in their wide sweeps of destruction, with a moral order in the universe, we may call attention to the fact that they occur in conformity with atmospheric and meteoric laws which alone render life possible, and under shelter of which every breathing thing exists, and moves, and grows, and sees the world, and feels the sun; so that the same rules which are death-dealing for an hour or a day, are life-giving for ever.

The real question is simply this: whether the laws of which complaint is made, work such harm that they ought never to have been enacted; or whether, in spite of occasional disasters in their path, the sentient existence of which they are the conditions has in its history a vast excess of blessing.

SUFFERING A POSTULATE OF THE INTELLECTUAL
AND MORAL NATURE.

In man suffering gains additional intensity through the intellectual faculties which enable him to look forward in anticipation, backward in memory, and to put himself, in a very true sense, in the place of suffering friends, thus in these three ways greatly multiplying his suffering. But it is equally true that through the same faculties he is enabled as greatly to multiply his joys.

But further, suffering is a postulate of our moral nature. No one can be brave, without regulating the importunities of fear; or generous, without setting the true limit to anger; or just, without subordinating pity to the sense of right. The very elements that make up the cases of duty are thus, in innumerable instances, relative to the presence of suffering, and in its absence would themselves disappear. Suffering thus holds a place among the data of the moral life, and is essential to this highest term in the ideal of humanity.

And suffering is not only the postulate from which our moral nature starts; it is also *the discipline* through which it gains its true elevation. Without suffering no man is ennobled. A large part of human pain comes from unrealized

ideals. Yet to this source of unrest we evidently owe the whole impulse which saves both individuals and society from a stationary existence. More readily still will it be admitted that but for sorrow the heart would seldom find its rest in God.

THE PROBLEM OF MORAL EVIL.

But what shall we say of *moral evil* in the world? Why, it may be asked, were we not so made that sin would have been an impossibility to us? This question, like the similar one asked about the physical world, assumes that there is nothing we may not ask from the omnipotence of God. This, however, we have already seen would not be true of a God who had quitted his unconditional infinitude, and instituted a cosmical existence.

God is no doubt the source of the *possibility* of sin, having set up the created wills in which it originates, and left them free to choose alternatives. But only by thus abstaining from pre-determining necessity, and allowing play for preferential choice, could he leave room for the exercise of *character* and the testing of fidelity. In virtue of this abstinence, God is at once the cause of the existence of human character, and *not* the cause of what that character should be.

It is *because He is holy*, and cannot be content with an *unmoral* world, where all the perfection is *given* and none is *earned*, that he refuses to render guilt impossible, and inward harmony mechanical.

Were he only benevolent, it would suffice to fill his creation with the joy of sentient existence; but, being righteous too, he would have in his presence beings nearer to himself, determining themselves by free preference to the life which he approves; and preference there cannot be, unless the double path is open. To set up, therefore, an absolute barrier against the admission of wrong, is to arrest the system of things at the mere natural order, and detain life at the stage of a human menagerie, instead of letting it culminate in a moral society.

The weightier problem before the righteous creator of the human race would seem to be this: how to provide the free conditions of *character*, and at the same time best secure *its tending upward*. Has this problem been solved? Let us see.

DOES THE SYSTEM OF THINGS TEND UPWARD
MORALLY?

Nothing takes place morally except what takes place *through one's own self-determination*. To

provide for this, man is endowed with will. In order to give scope for the intervention of will, there must arise some conflict between the intensity of one impulse and the higher worth of another. This constitutes *temptation* and gives opportunity for self-determination. But unless the temptations are kept within bounds disastrous results may ensue. Are they thus limited? The answer is two-fold.

1. All men do not want the same sins, but all respect the same excellences. This difference in the temptations of men is security against the permanent dominance of any one sin, and furnishes hope of the final subordination of all.

2. In rightly directed will there is a cumulative force; while neglect and misuse entail a dying away of will, till the possibility of self-determination practically vanishes, and the moral life is to all intents and purposes expunged. But Will is power; power is thus being always lost by those in whom conscience sleeps, and always gained by those who form themselves by the higher law.

THE TESTIMONY OF HISTORY TO THE MORAL TREND IN NATIONS AND RACES.

Does not history negative the above reasoning, by showing humanity abandoned to the con-

flict and triumph of rude force? No! There are four distinct types of character which mark the stages of ascent in personal and social life. They are:

1. That of *instinctive appetite and passion*, in which there is the least remove from the condition of other animals;

2. That of *self-conscious pursuit of personal and social ends*, involving the first exercise of will;

3. That of *conscience*, in which these ends are taken, not as we like, but as we *ought*;

4. That of *faith*, in which the conflict is transcended between what we like and what we ought, and duty becomes divine. And not only are these stages each relatively higher than the preceding, but the types of character are increasingly strong.

Moreover, *races* repeat in their experience these same successive stages of character, and exhibit among them the same relations of graduated strength. The impulsive or instinctive period is the time of petty wars and small communities. The self-conscious pursuit of social ends absorbs the petty tribes into the great trading commonwealths, of which Phœnicia stands as a primitive example. The genius of the Phœnicians was mercantile enterprise; they

were the typical embodiment of *gainful desires*. When the time arrived for them to come into collision with the grave and vigorous Roman, no individual genius, no prowess, could avert their fall before the sterner moral solidity against which they were flung. The commercial civilization, which was great on the commercial exchanges of the world, went down before a law-giving and law-abiding people, whose mission it was to codify the social conscience of the human race.

CHRISTIANITY AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE UPWARD
MORAL TREND OF THINGS.

Yet when that mighty Rome had for three centuries ruled the civilized world, an unnoticed competitor for the homage and allegiance of hearts stole in at the background of the scene. It was Christianity. Insisting also on a common law,—administered, it is true, in no Prætor's court,—but insisting far more, on a blending affection, Christianity asserted its superior vitality by stepping across the boundaries of empire, raising its altar in opposite camps, and quietly surviving the shocks of revolution. As the old order caved in and made a disastrous ruin, the new religious organism lifted its head and grew; and whether we judge the inward

unity which it created, by its intensity or its duration, it far transcended that of the great secular empire which it superseded.

History, thus interpreted, is no record of the rude strength, but, on the contrary, it attests the ever advancing superiority of the higher terms in the hierarchy of powers.

V. PANTHEISM AS A SYSTEM OF THOUGHT OPPOSED TO BELIEF IN GOD.

The Theism which has been thus far vindicated has been reached by two distinct lines of thought, each taking its commencement from a primary axiom of our cognitive nature. The first proceeds from the principle of Causality, which the Intellect carries with it into all its interpretations of external phenomena; the second, from the sense of Duty, by which the Conscience reads a sacredness in life, and puts a divine construction on a large portion of our internal experience.

Under the guidance of the former we have resolved the natural world into an effect of one wise and mighty Will; under the guidance of the latter, we have discovered our own affinity with a supreme omniscient Righteousness; and,

from the relation between these separate messages of transcendent truth, it is quite evident that they are separate only to our different modes of apprehension, and that their predicates meet in one Being, perfect alike in Thought and Holiness. In working out, on the first line, the relation of God to Nature, an easy deviation leads to Pantheism; and, on the second, the relation of God to man may be so conceived as to issue in Necessarianism, or, as it is now more usually called, Determinism. Neither of these doctrines is compatible with the form of Theism which we have deduced, since the former invalidates all personal, and the latter all moral, relations between the human and the Divine Mind.

But the claims of each to acceptance must be investigated and invalidated before the position assumed in the present treatise can be perfectly secured. Dr. Martineau therefore considers, next in order, these two subjects, Pantheism and Determinism.

THEISM AND PANTHEISM CONTRASTED.

The word Pantheism is so often applied to a mode rather of feeling than of thought, that it may seem to mark a temperament more than a system, the immediate vision of the poet, and not the reflective interpretation of the philoso-

pher. Pantheism has, however, crystallized into systems forming a well marked group in the history of thought.

What are its relations to Theism?

In reasoning out the principle of Causality we were necessarily brought to treat the universe of phenomena as an *effect*, and we were led from *this effect* to a *source* or beginning of things. Thus far we settled only the question of *origination*. So long as Theism engages itself with simply settling its "First Cause," there is nothing to prevent its laying down the relation of God to the universe on this wise:

1. The world was created in time; prior to which its Divine Cause existed from eternity without it. It will sometime perish; after which its Divine Cause will exist to eternity without it.

2. In setting it up, the Creator willed its order into being once for all, depositing in its materials the properties which would execute his purpose spontaneously, without need of his returning to it again.

3. The creation thus organized is finite, while its maker is infinite; so that beyond its limits, his presence boundlessly extends, and is only in external relation to it.

4. Like all that is finite, the world is imperfect, never realizing the perfect idea of its author.

Thrown into this form (which, as a mere doctrine of origination, it could hardly fail to assume), Theism establishes a series of antitheses between the Universe and God. What is present with us and around us is only a mechanism running down through its appointed term, while its originator has withdrawn himself within the eternal beyond. Such was the Deism of the eighteenth century, and minds that are dominated by mechanical conceptions, will always tend to such negative results.

But if reflection escapes these limits, it may take a different direction and assume another form of thought. We may question each of the propositions enumerated above.

1. Is the idea of *Creation in time* tenable? Why and when did God begin to create? Was there a defect in his being, without a universe? If so, how did he spend an eternity without it? By such questioning as this we become aware of difficulties attaching to the doctrine of creative paroxysms chronologically separating God from what is other than God, and we pass over to the idea of *perpetual creation*, and let the Divine

presence no longer come in *visits* to the world, but *rest in it forever*.

2. When once the conception of creative starts is dismissed, God becomes the One Cause in nature, and we have no further need for second causes; they would lie idly on our hands.

3. Again, were we really justified in saying that creation is finite while its author is infinite? Truer far to regard the two as co-extensive, and suffer the scope of the universe to coalesce with the Infinitude of God. So here in another point the antithesis ceases between Nature and its Source.

4. Finally, if nature at every turn has thus rallied from the shock of its first depreciation, and assumes a place rather of approximation than of contrast to God, if whatever it shows is an aspect of his thought, then the dark material mass of matter becomes incandescent with the currents of a Divine Life forever streaming through it, till the gloomiest spaces flash with heavenly promise.

ALL IMMANENCY VERSUS SOME TRANSCENDENCY.

Thus, one by one, all the marks seem to disappear by which our Theism opposed to each other the maker and his works. There is no longer any separation between them, in time or

space, or causality or quality; he who legislates also executes: the natural and supernatural are one.

In this transition, supposing it to be made absolute, we have passed into *Pantheism*. Can we find any single characteristic which sums up its difference from the previous Theism?

May we not say that in the original form of belief, God was conceived as *transcending* the universe every way, as infinite, as eternal, as source, as perfection; while in the subsequent Pantheism the universe is lifted out of its limits and its transiency, and is identified with his will in its energy, and his thought in its excellence; so that it is the simple externalization of his being, and he is wholly immanent in it?

This is the generally received distinction between Theism and Pantheism. But the claim of Divine transcendency involves no denial of Divine immanency. Thus far there is no opposition between Theism and Pantheism. The conflict begins with the pantheist's *negative* proposition: that beyond the natural order of things and prior to it no Divine life or agency can be.

The theist would not plant all Divine agency outside of nature except at her birth hour; any more than would the pantheist. It is sufficient for him if God be *more than the contents of*

nature, and *overpass them* in his being, action and perfection. The opposition therefore lies between *all-immanency* and *some transcendency*. It is perfectly consistent with the theistic position to hold the conception of an indwelling God whose living thought marks its way in the unsleeping order of nature, and whose will is self-realizing in human life and history; to see in the constant duties and the inconstant lights and shadows of human life a quickening communion with an invisible source of all beauty and good. Such conceptions of the immanence of God are in no wise antagonistic to the doctrine of his transcendence.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PANTHEISM AND ATHEISM.

The pantheistic conception may be reached by either of two opposite paths: either by resolving nature upward into the universal power, or by bringing God downward into living possession of the whole realm of nature. The first begins with the scientific list of natural forces, and by repeated mergings reaches at last a single primary. If the primary, thus inductively reached and treated as our terminus, be in its conception purely mechanical or chemical, our theory of the universe will be *atheistic*; if our primary present itself to us not as an inorganic

but as a living power pervading the universe, but lacking self-conscious and intending mind, our theory will be *pantheistic*.

If, when the universe is taken up into God, we start from the idea of Absolute Cause, intellectual or mystical forms of Pantheism arise, which, instead of regarding the Deity as only the common term or last generalization of all subordinate life, see nature glorified as the garment of God. Both these types of pantheism, however, agree in removing all distinction between the natural and the supernatural.

As a transition from Deism, Pantheism can hardly fail to appear, at first sight, an escape into a higher view. Whether, however, this change from Deism toward Pantheism be a concession to weakness or an emergence into a higher and fuller truth, depends upon the extent to which the change is carried. So long as the immanence of pantheism is limited to physical nature it is justifiable.

OBJECTIONS TO THE METHOD OF PANTHEISM.

The form in which the idea of causality comes to us is that of *Will*, and the only question that can rationally arise is, whether the action of Divine Will is most easily conceived as continuous through the operation it performs; or as

momentary in itself, and handing over the prolonged part of the efficiency to a system of means, inert in themselves, but charged with delegated power cut off from its source.

The latter supposition has nothing to recommend it. Against the former it may be objected that it involves an incessant and universal intervention of God in the minutest affairs. But is there any assignable reason for parsimony in the expenditure of immeasurable Will? Why may it not disperse itself in myriad drops, instead of pouring itself forth all in one flow? It is not in the field of action, but in that of thought, that we are restive under complexity, and forever pressing our demand for unity; and in the immanence and boundless distribution of Divine energy there is nothing at variance with perfect simplicity of purpose and intellectual symmetry of method; any more than our own repetitions of will in each reproduction of habitual action are inconsistent with a rational system of life.

The theist, therefore, need have no fear of the number of Divine volitions, and if we have rightly construed the source and meaning of our causal ideas, the one thing certain is that, however wide the sweep and durable the continuance of the laws of physical change, they

are entrusted with no causality of their own, but are only the modes of the Divine action.

The whole external universe (external to self-conscious beings) then, the theist may, with the pantheist, unreservedly surrender to the indwelling Will, of which it is the organized expression. From no point of its space, from no moment of its time, is his living agency withdrawn, or less intensely present than in any crisis called creative.

DIVINE IMMANENCE LIMITED TO PHYSICAL NATURE.

Only at the boundary of the *proper Ego* does the theistic theory of the universe find ground upon which the Supreme Will arrests itself. Did that Supreme Will still press on and annex this field also, it would simply *abolish the very base of its own recognizable existence*, and, *in making itself all in all, would vanish totally from view*. It is precisely in *not being unitary* that causation is *accessible to thought at all*; and if our own will does not exercise it we are excluded from even the search for it elsewhere.

The voluntary nature of moral beings, then, must be saved from pantheistic absorption, and be left standing as, within its sphere, a free cause other than Divine, yet homogeneous with

it. You cannot even declare yourself a pantheist without self contradiction; for in doing so you reserve your own personality as a thinking and assertive power that deals with all else as objective.

If, however, the will of each rational being must be allowed a sphere of its own, the same is true of his whole personality including intellect, conscience and affections. It is not another, even the Infinite, that decides for us, neither is it another that is tempted, that strives and prays.

WHY EXEMPT HUMANITY FROM DIVINE IMMANENCE ?

To the doctrine as thus shaped it may perhaps be objected that, while it admits the Divine action as immediately present in the lower provinces of the cosmos, it excludes that action from the highest, viz., our moral life,—precisely the sphere that is nearest to God and would seem most congenial to him.

Are we then to find God in the sunshine and the rain, and to miss him in our thought, our duty, and our love? Far from it. He is with us in both; only in the former it is his *immanent life*, in the latter his *transcendent life*, with

which we are in communion. It is not indeed he that, under the mask of our personality, does our thinking, and praying against temptations, and weeps our tears: these are truly our own; but they are in presence of a sympathy free to answer, spirit to spirit; neither merging in the other; but both at one in the same inmost preferences and affections.

This alone it is that gives scope for a Divine *personal being, living with persons*, and acting on grounds of reason and righteousness. Without freedom thus to act freshly out of immediate thought and affection, intellect, character, personality can have no place in the Divine causality.

GOD'S TRANSCENDENCY CONSTITUTES HIS INFINITY
AND PERSONALITY.

This personality of God thus rescued from pantheistic absorption, not only leaves his voluntary agency as free cause in an unpledged sphere, that is, a sphere transcending that of immanent law, but precisely this it is that constitutes his *Infinity*, extending his sway over all the possible, after it has filled the actual, and giving command over infinite alternatives. Hence it is plain that his personality and his

infinity are so far inseparable concomitants that, though you might deny his infinitude without prejudice to his personality, you cannot deny his personality without sacrificing his infinitude; since there is one mode of action—the *preferential*,—the very mode which distinguishes rational beings,—from which you exclude him in denying him personality.

DIVINE PERSONALITY DEFENDED.

We are constantly told that a personal being is necessarily finite; that he is an individual, not a universal; restricted to a definite centre of consciousness and activity, into which and from which influences flow that make up his life. In short a *self* implies an *other-than-self*, and so gives two spheres of being, only one of which would be God and the other his negative. What answer shall we make to this?

According to the division we have been defending, this *other than* the *Divine Self* is the aggregate of rational and moral beings, represented in our world by man. This man, as endowed with *Will*, we have actually treated as a separate cause, and so we have apparently accepted a limit to the infinitude of God. But surely it is not impossible or unreasonable that infinite Will should divest itself of a portion of

its causality in order to fit up another and resembling nature. This nature thus set up, is included in what God *has caused* though exempted from what he is *causing*; and the causality conceded to us takes therefore nothing from the Creator's infinitude, but what he himself renounces; moreover, what is thus relinquished is potentially retained.

SELF-RENUNCIATION OF THE CREATOR.

Alike in setting up other minds with a range of command over alternatives, and instituting a universe under law without alternative, the infinite Cause foregoes something of his absolute freedom; in the one case admitting partners of his liberty; in the other, establishing for himself a sphere of necessity; and the more comprehensive the sphere of necessity or law, the vaster is the renunciation; if it extends to the All, so as to leave no margin of transcendency, the limitation reaches its maximum, no possibility but one being left open anywhere. What greater contradiction can there be than to say in one breath, that a being is infinite and omnipotent, and yet cannot put forth preferential power? And if we are careful for his infinitude, which shall we be more afraid to grant,—that he lends to a derivative being a little preferential power;

or that he is forever incapacitated for exercising it himself?

BELIEF IN GOD'S PERSONALITY THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THEISM AND PANTHEISM.

"For these reasons the modern scruples that are felt with regard to the personality of God," says Dr. Martineau, after a full presentation of the subject, "appear to me not less intellectually weak than they are morally deplorable. If any one is fastidious about the *word*, and thinks it spoiled by the Athanasian controversy, let him supply us with a better; but *some* symbol we must have of that Divine freedom in the exercise of Will, the acknowledgment of which makes the difference between Theism and Pantheism, and gives religion its entrance into the conscience and affections of men.

"As the parts of our nature which thus enter into relation with God are precisely those which make us *persons* and distinguish us from other 'living things' it is difficult to see why the same term should not be given to the corresponding attributes of rational and moral Will in him; and where the idea is really present, and craving expression, I believe that for the most part it will be glad enough for the word. At all events

its contents are just what Theism rescues from Pantheism.

"Here it is that the God, immanent through the universe besides, and operating by determinate methods alone, passes into transcendent existence still unpledged, and establishes moral relations with beings whom he has endowed with a certain scope of similar volitional causality."

VI. DETERMINISM AND FREE WILL AS A SYSTEM OF THOUGHT OP- POSED TO BELIEF IN GOD.

Each of the two lines of argument which have been followed in Dr. Martineau's "Study of Religion," namely, the argument for God as Cause and that for God as Holiness, starts with an intuitive assumption.

The first of these assumptions is, that in the exercise of Will we know what Causality is, and apprehend the Will of God along with our own. The second is, that the authority of Deity is known to us as a relation between our own Will as *free* and that of a higher and Supreme Being. Of that relation we are conscious as a trust, or *command of alternative*, better and worse, committed to us by a perfect Righteousness.

But this appeal to self-consciousness through the exercise of will and conscience is *set aside* on various ingenious pleas. Our belief in our own moral freedom, that is, our belief that in the moment of yielding to one of two competing solicitations, we might have preferred the other, arises merely, it is said, from a partial ignorance of the complex influences that mould our decisions, and when our inward history is laid bare, each volition will be found to have its place in a regular consecution of phenomena, as uniform as physical nature, and as little open to contingency. Thus has arisen the discussion between Determinism and Free Will. Into this discussion Dr. Martineau enters with much fullness.

THE PROBLEM STATED.

The inquiry concerns the originating cause of voluntary action, and is mainly this: *Whether, in the exercise of Will (i.e., in cases of choice) the mind is wholly determined by phenomenal antecedents and external conditions, or whether, as active subject of these objective experiences, it plays the part of determining Cause.* Those who take the first or necessarian alternative draw their arguments chiefly from a psychological theory of voluntary action. Dr.

Martineau selects James and John Stuart Mill and Professor Bain as representatives of this class of thinkers, and analyzes their lines of argument. The reasoning is somewhat abstruse, but worth following.

THE ARGUMENT FOR DETERMINISM.

1. All muscular movements, so these thinkers hold, are at first automatic and so far take place at random, that, springing from some sensation either administered from without or occurring in the interior of the body, they partake of the accidental character of these sensations. We begin by being absolutely disposed of by such sensations persistent or fortuitous.

2. Through the laws of association and imitation, idea (sensation) and action are inseparably associated; given the idea, the action will certainly follow.

Thus the determinist or necessarian explains *involuntary* actions.

But action may become the attendant of many ideas. Associated with the particular idea of pleasure or desire, action becomes *voluntary*. How is *this* effected, and what is the law of *voluntary action*? Some movement, accidentally performed, brings us, it may be, a pleasure or relief, which henceforth becomes connected

with it in idea, so that whatever suggests the pleasure suggests the movement too. The mere idea of an attainable pleasure, occurring in the natural train of thought, will bring with it the idea of what we are to do in order to get it, that is, idea of the motory initiative and process; and, each link by indissoluble association drawing after it the next, the operation consummates itself. By frequent repetitions this process becomes habit. Thus the voluntary stage springs from the automatic, and in the shape of habit, is delivered back to automatism again.

DETERMINISM IN THE INNER LIFE.

In the control which we also obtain over our *inward* life, the same dominant principle, viz., the interest of *an end in view*, no less supplies the explanation. All these processes are *voluntary* because their regulative idea is a want or wish which is so associated with an order of muscular movement, or of thought competent to its fulfilment, that the preconception is the sole condition needful to secure the entire sequel. We *want a pleasure* as an end, and having some experience of muscular motion as sometimes happy in its results, we set it a going in a random way of "trial and error." This explains


the genesis of *effort*, which Mr. Bain regards as consisting in "trial-movements" for *pleasure*.

If this be the true theory of voluntary action, it is evident that our volitions are dependent, like our memories, on the laws of suggestion, and have their definite place in trains of ideas, as little variable as the letters of the alphabet; that *to will* is to have an idea of pleasure followed by a muscular movement that clings to it; and that whoever or whatever wakes up the first secures the second; that we have no more to do with our acts of will, so-called, than to be the conscious theatre and supply the wielded implements. No room, therefore, is left for *Free Will* unless the facts admit of some other psychological construction. Do they admit of other construction?

THE DETERMINIST POSITION EXAMINED.

Dr. Martineau reviews this necessarian theory of volition and finds:

1. That the first movements called spontaneous, are *not random*, but on the lines prescribed by certain organic wants or tendencies; and the first pleasures are simply the satisfaction of these wants.
2. Life is *not* a mere wriggling into contact with something nice, which thenceforth becomes its master; but *rather* contains within itself its



DETERMINIST POSITION ~~GAIN~~ EXAMINED 113

own directing forces, which select what to do, and crown the doing by satiety.

If we set up the direct "idea of pleasure" as the governing principle, and ignore the prior natural principles, we can never give accounts of the undoubted cases in which we *court our own misery*, when, for example, on the urgency of compassion, we tear ourselves from the sunshine of life and plunge into its clouds of sorrow. *Will* comes into play with the attempt to *control the spontaneity*, and make it *do this* and *not do that*, i.e., when there is some *selection*.

By thus limiting the range of Will to the function of *determining an alternative*, we take up the problem at the point where first two co-present tendencies conflict. Suppose, for example, that you suffer under some calumny admitting disproof; your natural course would be to give the exculpating statement. But if, in doing so, you must cast a shadow on some fair name, or embitter some precious friendship, your impulse will be arrested by a resistance equally natural. Consider what takes place in deciding this conflict. The elements present are (1) two incompatible springs of action,—the desire to save your own credit, and the desire to save that of others; and (2) what may be called *your own past*, i.e., a certain formed

system of habits and dispositions brought from your previous use of life.

The former of these two heads comprise the *motives* that are offered; the latter, the *character* that has come to be. Do these settle the matter between them? Is the character the arena on which the play, or rather the war, of the motives fights itself out, and is the volition, the flash of the stronger sword? Or, inverting the parts of active and passive, shall we say that the past character, instead of lying still and *being influenced* by the triumphant motive comes in as umpire between them, *giving the as-with* itself? Or is our account still incomplete; *cendency* to that which is the more consonant and must we admit that, besides the motives felt, and besides our formed habits or past self there is also a *present self* that has a part to perform in reference to both?

Is there not a *causal self*, over and above the *caused self* (or rather the *caused state and contents* of the self left as a deposit from previous behaviour)? Is there not a *judging self* that knows and weighs the competing motives, over and above the *agitated self that feels them*? The *impulses* are but phenomena of your experience; the *formed habits* are but a condition and attitude of your consciousness, in virtue of

which you feel this more and that less; both are *predicates* of yourself as subject, but are not *yourself*, and cannot be identified with your personal agency. On the contrary, they are *objects of your contemplation*; they lie before you to be known, compared, estimated; they are your data; and you have not to let them alone to work together as they may, but to deal with them, as arbiter among their tendencies.

It is this that we mean when we say that "it rests with us to decide," that "our impulses are not to be our masters," that "guilty habit cannot be pleaded in excuse for guilty act"; the deciding Ego of a rational self-consciousness will never allow that it is *obliged to follow* the importunities of its feelings; it will insist on the contrary, that it can *command* them.

CONCLUSION.

After a careful review and analysis of the whole necessarian argument, the conclusion is reached that the empirical psychology does not dispose of our consciousness of personal causation, or succeed in reducing us to a theater of felt antecedents and consequents. There remains the indelible conviction that we are not bound hand and foot by either our present incentives or our own past, but that, drag as they

may, a power remains with us to make a new beginning along another path if we will.

DETERMINISM AS RESULTING FROM CAUSALITY,
CONSIDERED.

But, while the *modern* determinist or necessarian relies chiefly on his *psychology*, the *older* writers trusted chiefly certain *axioms of causality*. These, also, are carefully reviewed with the deductions supposed to flow logically from them, the whole forming a critical history of a whole school of philosophic thinking.

We can only indicate the trend of Dr. Martineau's argument, but the steps by which these results are reached will repay careful study.

We have found that we could know God as Cause, and as Holy. If we know God as *intending Cause*, if we see in the universe an organized system of ends, he comes before our thought as a prospective Mind, whose agency, at every present moment, has regard to an anticipated future; and to suppose that future invisible to him, is to suppose the present impossible.

And if, again, we know him as *Supreme Author of Right*, if we see in our own consciences the reflection of his Will, we thereby place ourselves under a discipline of progressive charac-

ter, and the human race under a moral education, by which all life and history are turned into a probationary scene of government. But such a scene ceases to be a blind jumble of accidents and becomes a *drama*, in which the end is preconceived from the beginning, and each act, as it passes, brings up the conditions and the persons needful to lead on to the consummation. He, without whom there would be no future but his own, cannot create a future of which he has not first the idea. It is not without reason, therefore, that prescience has been assumed by theologians as part of the conception of a Perfect Being.

But does the prescience thus evidenced involve determinism in human action? In the theological form as often deduced from Scripture, it certainly does. If the impieties of Antiochus Epiphanes, the restoring acts of Cyrus, the betrayal by Judas, the reforming zeal of Josiah, were all fore-announced, some of them ages before the persons were born, and if these predictions, thus made, were verified, it can only have been by the exclusion of contingency; a thing known for certain cannot be uncertain. Such prescience would preclude human free will.

THE ARGUMENT ANSWERED.

To this reasoning Dr. Martineau answers: The

prescience required by philosophic Theism is not of this definite and individual kind, except in the domain of physical nature, where choice has no place. Beyond this, in the world of intelligences, a margin of freedom being allowed, the lines of possibility are not rectilinear, but divergent, and open a way into innumerable hypothetical fields, among which, as yet invisible, lies the actual.

In the outlook upon this realm which embraces the future, what is needed, in order that the intending causality of God, and his moral government, may secure their ends and shape their means? Simply, that no one of the open possibilities shall remain in the dark to the Infinite Omniscience, and pass unreckoned; and that they shall all, in their working out, be compatible with the ruling purposes of God, not defeating the aim, but only varying the track.

An infinite mind, with prevision thus extended beyond all that is, to all that *can* be, is lifted above surprise or disappointment, and able to provide for all events and combinations; yet, instead of being shut up in a closed and mechanized universe, lives amid the free play of variable character and contingent history, into which there is room for approval, pity, and love to flow.

GOD'S LIMITATION A SELF-LIMITATION.

Is this a *limitation* of God's foresight, that he cannot read all volitions that are to be? Yes; but it is a *self-limitation*, just like his abstinence from causing them. Lending to us a portion of his causation, he refrains from covering all with his omniscience. Fore-knowledge of the contingent is not a perfection; and if, rather than have a reign of universal necessity and stereotyped futurity, he willed, in order to prepare scope for a gift of moral freedom, to set up a range of alternative possibilities, he would but render some knowledge conditional for the sake of making any righteousness attainable; leaving enough that is determinate, for science; and enough that is indeterminate, for character.

"There is no absurdity in supposing," says Dugald Stewart, "that the Deity may, for wise purposes, have chosen to open a source of contingency in the voluntary actions of his creatures, to which no prescience can possibly extend." Such contingency leaves room for Freedom of the Will, and this freedom explains the "ought" of conscience which on the theory of Determinism is inexplicable. Determinism can tell us what has been, what is, what probably will be, but not what *ought* to be.

VII. THE LIFE TO COME.

The last subject discussed by Dr. Martineau is "The Life to Come." In a sense this is not a necessary part of the main subject of Theism to which his book is devoted. Yet in his view it is so necessary an implication from Theism, and practically it has so vital a relation to man's religious life, that a careful and extended presentation of the arguments in its support are regarded as necessary.

The question of a Future Life depends upon the interpretation of Death. To find the true significance of Death will require that we examine it in three points of view: physiological, metaphysical, and moral.

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL VIEW OF DEATH CONSIDERED.

To the naturalist, death presents itself simply in antithesis to birth. The fundamental conception of his science so defines the relation of *organs* and *functions* as to make the *function* the act which the organ has to do; so that, when the organ is spoiled and gone the living function cannot remain. This view would seem to make a life after death impossible.

But the moment we touch the conscious and

the voluntary we are flung upon facts not known in physics. "The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness," says Professor Tyndall as quoted by Dr. Martineau, "is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought and a definite molecular action in the brain, occur simultaneously, we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one to the other. They appear together, but we do not know why.

Were our minds and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their electrical discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately acquainted with the corresponding state of thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever from the solution of the problem of how these physical processes are connected with the facts of consciousness. The chasm between the two classes would still remain intellectually impassable."

If, then, in the molecular motions, groupings, and electrical discharges of the brain we have its *function*, that organ finds its function in a

class of phenomena separated by "a chasm intellectually impassable" from consciousness and will. If the organic and the mental phenomena lie thus apart, how can any legitimate inference carry us from the one to the other? If no one can affirm their connection to be necessary, who can affirm their disconnection to be impossible?

A FURTHER ANSWER.

Still another argument against the physicist's view of death is found in the law of the conservation of energy. An illustration is drawn from the effect of a whispered message, "Your library is on fire," to show that when we come to follow out the law of conservation of energy, the force of moving air used in the whisper will not account for all the energy displayed in what follows. If the law of conservation did hold good, if the mental activity—the thoughts and feelings awakened by the whispered message—might be omitted without disturbance to the dynamic question, then they cost nothing in the way of energy; they are not, therefore, physical effects drawing upon a physical cause. They are exempt from the law of conservation which pervades the physical sphere; they belong to another universe; and mind emerges as something independent of matter. If, on the other hand, the

transmission of energy in the supposed case is *not* complete within the bodily organism, then indeed it follows that mind is not independent of matter, but also that matter is not independent of mind.

In its physical aspects death presents simply a case of transformation of energy. In crossing the mortal line, the total energy which had manifested itself in the heat and the whole work of the body is not altered, and might be gathered up and measured, though every organ is cold and every function is at rest. But we should miss in this estimate any element answering to the *thoughts, the affections, the volitions* which were the concomitants of the muscular contraction and nerve tension in the living man. If these mental activities are included in the category of "energy," then, since they are not transformed, they still continue; for were they extinct the law of conservation would be broken. If they are not included, if the cycle of energy is perfect without them, then they lie outside the physical world, and are foreign to its fates.

We may conclude, therefore, that in the physical phenomena of death there is nothing to prejudge the question of a life beyond.


DEATH AND PERSONAL IDENTITY.

But a deeper question is, Will death leave the

personal identity untouched, and permit the story of the past to flow on in continuous sequel? This problem hangs on the nature, not of the *animal consciousness*, but of human *self-consciousness*. In its solution recourse is had to the physiological principle that in living beings, we are justified in expecting a due proportion between organ and function, between faculty and range of life. The animal body, as animal, is a machine, charged with powers, unconscious and conscious, for preserving, regulating, replacing itself. There is not a propensity or a sagacity that is not subservient to this system of ends.

But in the self-conscious human animal we find a difference. Who would ever think of referring the sentiment of *wonder* to its physiological use? It neither helps the digestion nor regulates the temperature; it succors no weakness, it repels no foe; the labor to which it incites, the enthusiasm which it kindles, often detract from the animal perfection and consume the organic powers that serve it. The sense of *beauty*, too, in its human maturity, emerges from the sphere of sense and takes possession of an ideal world, moulding thought into literature, and character into drama.

Compassion, sympathy, and attachment serve in us, no doubt, the same ends for which they more or less exist in other creatures. But how



soon and how far do they transcend this simply useful function, and claim a good upon their own account? Judging these features by a prospective instead of a retrospective measure, surely we should conclude that it is for these we are made; these it is to which we must yoke our physical power in a humble service, by which we are to rise above the physical, and to pass into a life of larger dimensions.

This view Professor Fiske is quoted as confirming. "The more thoroughly we comprehend that process of evolution by which things have come to be what they are, the more we are likely to feel that to deny the everlasting persistence of the spiritual element in man is to rob the whole process of its meaning. For my own part, therefore, I believe in the immortality of the soul, not in the sense in which I accept the demonstrable truths of science, but as a supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of God's work."

THE METAPHYSICAL ASPECT OF DEATH.

The metaphysical interpretation of Death to which we next turn, presses upon us the question, What is it that survives the perishing organism, if survival there be? If we call it *the Soul*, whence have we the idea of such a possible

prisoner escaped? Is it from ~~any~~ source which renders it legitimate, and justifies our acceptance of it as trustworthy? Dr. Martineau finds the basis of this idea where he found the basis of our religious belief in God, namely, in the constitution of human nature.

The persistent element to which we give the name soul, is given to us not by our senses or our imagination, but as an intuition from our experience of personality; the conscious self-identity which we have as the abiding subject of variable phenomena; the identity consisting not in a reserve of stereotyped phenomena, but in the unity of the *Ego* or *Self* to which all the attributes and phenomena belong,—a unity undisturbed by the greatest contrasts of experience and revolution of character.

This durable *selfdom* attaches to us,, not as *conscious*, but as *personal* (i. e. *self-conscious*) beings. This constant centre to which we refer all our acts as their source, and all our experiences as their receptacle, is what we mean by the *Soul*. Hence the soul or self stands for us as the permanent term in a relation of change.

From this subjective origin of the idea, it is evident that of the soul as *an object* we predicate nothing beyond the bare space definition

of here and there, by which one is differenced from another. As a constant it is indifferent to time; as it is not a thing offered to perception, it is not open to the tests of analysis. Its self-identity, however, we are obliged to affirm; nor when we would mark the felt unity of the cosmos through all space and time and change, have we any way of doing so but by planting *there* a *universal Soul*, as the centre whence its energies flow and whither its phenomena look?

This dominant *Self* of the universe we discriminate from the *physical* which it animates; we oppose it to the *phenomenal* which it puts forth; and we claim it as the reality of both. It is the All in its idea and its causality. Thus the human soul is individual, while God—the universal soul—is the cosmical aspect of the inward principle of existence; and they are homogeneous in our thought, except in the spheres at their disposal.

RELATION BETWEEN THE SOUL AND GOD: WILL DEATH DISSOLVE IT?


Let it be assumed, then, that we have first hand knowledge of a Self or Soul, whose permanence as a possible subject of experiences

is not contradicted by any organic phenomena, including those of death; and further, that this individual Ego has been set up by the Universal Mind in whose embrace it lives, and which it reflects in its miniature powers. How are we to conceive of the relation between these two? And especially is the relation in its nature such that death must dissolve it? Two metaphysical reasons are urged from the pantheistic side why it must be so:

(1) The relation has begun, therefore it must cease.

(2) The egoistic personality is finite, and cannot hold its ground amid the infinite.

(1) With reference to the first it may be answered that within the limits of organic life, whose history consists of a cycle of chemical changes, it is true that birth is the invariable precursor of a series leading to death; but beyond this range it cannot be shown that either mechanical or mental genesis must run its course and come to an end. If we can think of the law of gravitation as having been given to the material universe, surely we are not on that account compelled by any logical necessity to anticipate its cessation. And there is no assignable reason why the case should be otherwise



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with intellectual and moral natures. If at a certain stage in the development of the cosmos, the Supreme Mind set up at a given centre a personal subject of thought and will like his own, with adequate assignment of causality, what is to prevent this from being a freehold in perpetuity? Why may not the communicated Divine nature endure as long as the uncommunicated Source on which it lives?

So far as thought, and love, and goodness are related to time, their relation is not cyclical, but progressive, not returning to their beginnings, but opening out into indefinite enlargement and acceleration. The dictum, therefore, that whatever begins must end, is one to which we are not bound to surrender; and the only pre-existence which we need allow to the Soul is latent within its Divine Source, ere yet its idea has taken effect and the personal monad been set up.

(2) The other principal assumed, namely, that personality is a finite phenomenon and must sink back into its infinite ground, has played a much larger part in the reasoning upon this subject since the time of Spinoza.

CAN THE FINITE CO-EXIST WITH THE INFINITE?

But is it true that the finite cannot hold its place amid the infinite, and, that personality,

being a finite phenomenon, must sink back into its infinite ground? It certainly is true that here in this life the finite and infinite co-exist; and why, if possible now, should it become impossible after death?

The pantheist represents the human personality as an outline artificially drawn round a small enclosure, within which lie the individual experiences of a human life. To set up a living individual, he says, is simply to establish such a centre of special consciousness, and fence it off by a containing periphery, and let it for a while assert and discriminate itself as against the boundless environment from which it is cut out; and even while it lasts, this self-protection from the integral field is but an illusion, which death only dissipates, surrendering the individual back into the universal.

This mode of conception, borrowed from the relations of geometrical figures in space, confounds the *infinite with the total*, and erroneously assumes that the infinite is denied if we speak of anything besides. Of mere extension this will doubtless hold true, and we cannot say that the universal field of things is made up of infinitude *plus* the size of the sun. But this rule has no truth except where both terms are quantitative and homogeneous. The predicate

of magnitude belongs to time as well as space, and neither of them puts any bound upon the other; in affirming a square yard I do not put any bounds upon eternity.

When we carry the infinitude from quantity to quality, it ceases altogether to be a totality and becomes an intensity; and far from embracing all that is less than itself, completely excludes it. Infinite *knowledge*, for example, is perfect thought of all that has been, is, or can be, and does not comprise among its contents a partial knowledge in which truth and error both have their share; in order to meet *this* you must resort to another thinking subject, a mind of limited range. And what is there to prevent such finite intelligence from co-existing with the infinite?

The end pursued by the Will of the Creator in the creation of man would seem to be to set up what is *other* than himself, and yet akin; to mark off new centres of self-consciousness and causality, that shall have their separate histories and build up free personalities like his own. And why should not those free personalities, once built up, continue? Certain it is that here we come upon the very crown and culmination of the world's process. Personality is not the largest, but it is the highest fact in the

known cosmos; and if death has power over it, then there is nothing that death spares.

THE MORAL ASPECT OF DEATH.

Thus far no more has been attempted than to ward off unfavorable presumptions against the future life. Were the problem surrendered to physics and metaphysics, it could never quit its state of suspense. There would be nothing to forbid the future, but there would be nothing to promise it. Not till we turn to the *moral* aspects of death, do we meet with the presiding reasons which give the casting vote.

HINTS THAT MAN'S EARTHLY LIFE IS ONLY A
"FRAGMENT" AND A "PRELUDE."

As between beings, Divine and human, standing in spiritual relations to each other, what place does death hold and what significance does it apparently possess? Two facts we may note with respect to man.

(1) That the usual animal order of means and ends with him is inverted: the inner springs of action, instead of merely serving the organism, dominate it and use it; our faculties are set up on their own account, and carry their own ends.

(2) The Divine ends manifestly inwrought in our human nature and life, are continuous and of large reach; and, being here only partially or even incipiently attained, indicate that the present term of years is but a fragment and a prelude. When we place side by side the needs of human life, taken on the most liberal estimate, and the scope of the intellectual powers of man, do we not find the latter an enormous over-provision for the former?

MAN'S NATURE TRANSCENDS TIME AND SPACE.

For the sweetness and harmony of life, it would be enough if the voices of our companions were music to our ears, and their faces a light to our eyes; but we have need, it seems, of a wider capacity of fellowship, that takes no notice of the barriers of death: for what is literature, but the appeal of thought to thought and heart to heart through silent ages?

Space, too, belongs, in a very true sense, to man alone; and though other creatures have their retinas on which the starry vault shines in, it tells its depth and looks its meaning to no nightwatcher but man. Whence for an existence limited to a point, this insatiable interest in objects and movements, on the margin of infinitude?

Man as a creator, too, seems equally above his present lot. An Iliad, an Agamemnon, a Divina Commedia, a Hamlet, a Faust, a Madonna di San Sisto, is each a unique birth in which no second mind can bear a part; and go where it may, speak to what myriads it will, it is still the appeal of one soul to one, eliciting response as sharp and single as the echo of a solitary voice. Flowing forth from a single creative nature, it acts by its touch as an experiment in spiritual friendship, and gathers an ever-increasing group, held fast in fellowship of enthusiasm, and owning a common obligation to the genius which has discovered for them their true soul. What and where, then, are the two members of this relation? Is the first of them nothing and nowhere? Can a word that is immortal come from a speaker that is ephemeral?

THE EXTINCTION OF GREAT MINDS A GREAT
TRAGEDY.

I do not know that there is anything in nature which could be compared in wastefulness with the extinction of great minds; their gathered resources, their matured skill, their luminous insight, their unfailing tact, are not like instincts that can be handed down; they are absolutely personal and inalienable, and if the

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personality is to be blotted out they are lost from the universe.

Doubtless this faith in immortality owes its large extension among men in no slight degree to the secret feeling that in the nature of man there is more contained than the measure of the present life requires and satisfies.

A GREATER TRAGEDY THE EXTINCTION OF CONSCIENCE.

But it is when we turn to the Moral Conscientiousness that we hear a voice even more distinct demanding an existence larger than this mortal life. What is the meaning of probation? Liberty to go right—liberty to go wrong—can it be a mere haphazard gift, an unmeaning institution of contingency, as if from some curiosity to see what will turn up? And when the experiment is over, are the actors dismissed, the curtain dropped, and the theatre closed? Such an issue would contradict the very essence of moral freedom, which surely loses all significance if no difference is to be made between those who use it well and those who use it ill. We are not upon our trial, unless there is a future that depends upon ourselves. So that wherever Conscience is, there we stand only in

the fore-court of existence; and a moral world cannot be final, unless it be *everlasting*.

But it may be said that there are provisions in the organism of this world for making us feel the difference between right and wrong ways of living; that the physical laws of nature, and the sentiments of men, furnish both reward and retribution. Granted; but is the award certain and adequate? A careful study of facts compels a negative answer.

MAN'S RELATION TO GOD TRANSCENDS THE SCOPE
OF HIS EARTHLY LIFE.

From this survey of the great lines of human experience two inferences, seem to force themselves upon us:

(1) That *everywhere*,—in our conscience, in our physical nature, in the sentiments of associated men,—there are indelible marks of a morally constituted world *moving toward righteous ends*.

(2) That *nowhere*, within us or outside of us, do we find the *fulfilment* of this idea. These facts irresistibly suggest a *justifying sequel*. Thus the verdict of the moral nature is in harmony with that of the intellectual and spiritual, and both distinctly report to us that we stand in *Divine relations*, which *infinitely transcend the limits of our earthly years*.



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